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INTRODUCTION
The Far East today claims the attention of students of politics,
statesmen, scholars and the general public as never before. It has
become a storm center of world politics involving as it does the
interests of most of the Great Powers, and the immediate future of
the great Empires of Russia, China and Japan.
The writer of this thesis seeKs to throw some light on the com-
plicated problems of the Ear East by a study of Russian policy, parti-
cularly as it effects the interests of China and Japan. Following
a survey of the Russian expansion in Siberia to 1858, the author
undertakes a detailed study of Russian policy between 1858 and 1917.
To understand the events of this period one must definitely
realize that the Russian policy was defined by ministers who were
responsible only to the autocratic Czar and who in fact often enunciated
a personal policy of their own without let or hinderance by any such
institution as cabinet responsibility or loyalty. Indeed it was not
uncommon for one minister in the cabinet to be diametrically opposed to
the policy of another. Hence it was difficult for foreign countries
to determine just what the Russian policy actually was on problems of
international concern. In order to decide what attitude to adopt to-
ward Russia, at any given time, it was often necessary for the foreign
country to determine whi ch, minister happened to be most influential at
the Russian court at that time.

In general, most Russian ministers accepted the policy of estab-
lishing as many buffer states as possible along the frontiers of the
Empire as a measure of security against foreign invasion. Through-
out the nineteenth century, Russia had little difficulty in setting
up such buffer states along her Eastern frontiers for the newly ac-
quired territories did not seriously effect the interests of other
great powers.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, however, as
opposition to Russian eastward expansion stiffered, it was found ne-
cessary to adopt two other policies of expansion. One method was
the granting of aid to neighboring states for which Russia later de-
manded compensation. A second policy was one of watchful waiting,
for the purpose of exploiting the weakness of neighboring states
during periods of internal crises. All these methods of expansion
might have resulted in making Russia the most powerful Empire in the
Far East were it not for the determined opposition of rival European
powers and Japan.
In view of the increased opposition of foreign povsers there
developed a wide difference of opinion among groups of ministers and
statesmen in Russia itself as to the proper course that ought to be
followed in the Far East. One group* following a policy of aggressive
imperialism ^demanded occupation and exploitation of Manchuria, while
other ministers, desirous of avoiding war, sought Russia's advantage
in that region by peaceful methods of cooperation and conciliation.
After a struggle the imperialist faction gained control. They refused
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to evacuate Manchuria, leased Port Arthur and forced the opponents of
Russia to combine against her in self defense.
The policy of the imperialist faction at the Russian court,as
carried out in Mongolia and Manchuria between 1905 and 1917, illustrates
how imperialists, in order to defend their position in the buffer states
often changed their policy from aggression to conciliation without wait-
ing to be influenced by public opinion.
"In short," says Bau,^" "the Russian policy was imperialistic,
unscrupulous and opportunistic." A study of Russian policy will help
us to judge as to the truth of such statements.
1. Bau, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 4
(-
r

II. EARLY PENETRATION OF RUSSIA IN SIBERIA, 1581 - 1858
Peaceful Expansion and Contacts with Manchus
Russia became interested in the lands beyond the Ural Mountains
in the sixteenth century as a result of Yermak's expedition to the
Obi River. When this group of adventurers first started out they
had no backing from the Russian government for Russia was primarily
interested at that time in developing routes which would establish
contact with western Europe. Although Yermak was an outlaw and there
fore could not expect aid from Russia, he continued his conquests
until he reached the Obi River where he captured the Mongol town of
Sibir. The conquered territory Yermak later offered to the Czar in
1
order to recover his standing with the government. Russia accepted
the territory now that the power of the Mongols had been broken and
heaped great honors upon Yermak, the adventurer and conqueror.
Russian administration in Siberia brought little change to the
natives for they simply paid tribute to the Czar instead of to the
Tartar chiefs, as before. The new rulers, sent out by Russia, had
as their only aims private gain and the creation of fortimes for
themselves, to be gained by either legal or illegal means. Russian
1. Lattimore, "Manchuria, the Cradle of Conflict, w p. 113
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expansion continued peacefully, however, as the graft that existed
was no worse than it had been under the Tartar chiefs. New settlements
were made by the Russians and the tovois of Tiumen and Tobolsk were
founded in 1586 and 1587, respectively. Although these towns were
2
really ruled from Moscow, Tobolsk was made the nominal center of the
administration in Siberia.
Expansion into Eastern Siberia was continued by the Russians, who
by 1619 had reached the Yenissei River and in 1637 had established
Fort Yakutsk on the Lena River . From this time on Russian expansion
across Siberia tended to shift southward towards the Amur valley. By
1651 Khabarov had reached the Amur River and had sailed down the river
to the Pacific. He built a fort at the junction of the Amur and the
3
Ussuri rivers where later a city was built called Khabarovsk.
Russian expansion into the Amur region brought them into contact
with the Chinese and trouble developed at Albasin, an outpost on the
4
Russian frontier. The Russians were defeated by the Chinese in 1658
and for a time were driven out of the Amur territory. During the
1680's, however, the struggle for control of the Amur valley was re-
newed but in 1689 the two countries decided to settle their differences
by a treaty of peace.
2. Golder , "Russian Expansion in Pacific, 1641 - 1850," p. 18
3. Williams, "History of China," p. 232
4. Vladimir, "Russia on the Pacific," p. 132
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China was mainly interested in making an agreement which would
secure her from possible invasions by Russian adventurers, but was
not especially desirous of retaking the territory in which the
Russians had settled. According to Lattimore, it was traditional
Chinese statecraft to discourage any extension of Chinese population
northward and at this time there was no desire to occupy the territory
6
north of the Amur. Yakhontoff likewise claims that, "From the
correspondence between the Emperor Kwang-Hsi (1622-1721) and the
Czar of Moscow, one can see clearly that the Chinese Emperor did not
consider the regions adjoining the Amur River as belonging to his
crown. n China jtherefore
,
willingly sent messengers to Nerchinsk
to consider an agreement with Russia over the Amur territory.
Treaties of 1689 and 1727, Followed by Further Expansion
In the negotiations of Nerchinsk, Russia suggested that the Anur
River would be an excellent boundary between Russia and China. Ob-
viously if Russia should succeed in obtaining the Amur boundary it
would give her dontrol of all the places along the left bank of the
fciver which would enable her to kBep in touch with the fortress at
the outlet to the Pacific. It would lso allow her to build up a
strong protection at the moulh of the Anur. She was unable to gain
these advantages, however, for the Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, which
5. Lattimore, p. 108
6. Yakhontoff, "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East," p. 13

was the first treaty ever signed by China and a European power,
legalized the existing situation by leaving the lands north of the
river to the Russians, but excluded them from the use of the river
while jurisdiction over the territory east of the Ussuri was left
undecided. The treaty regarded the two countries as equals for
each nation was granted the right to have its subjects, guilty of
offenses in the territory of the other country, returned to judges
7
of their own nations. Subjects of either nation could come and
go across the frontier on private business and could carry on commerce
if they had the proper passports.
Neither country realized the importance of the Amur valley. China
did not appreciate the importance of the foothold Russia had acquired
by this treaty, while the latter did not realize how much she was losing
by her failure to acquire control of the Amur River. Russia was not
in a position to enforce her claims, for at this time China was strongly
under the control of the Manchus who had just conquered the country;
the Russians were a long distance from home where there was very little
interest in the situation anyway; and a poorly organized authority
8
was trying to settle and develop the territory north of the Amur. In
spite of difficulties, Russian authority succeeded in keeping peace
with the natives and in encouraging the settlers to develop trade.
7. Williams, p. 233
8. Vladimir, p. 136

To avoid future trouble over trading relations, Russia and China
signed a connercial treaty at Klakhta in 1727 by which commerce was
regulated and boundaries fixed. Earlier trade had been carried on
by caravans going across the desert of Mongolia to Peking. Now the
commercial treaty made provision for an exchange of goods on the
frontier, resulting in the development of the trade center of KiaJchta
on the Russian side and Maimachen on the Chinese side of the boundary.
All trade was carried on by means of barter for the use of money was
forbidden. This treaty also gave Russia the right to send priests
of the Greek Orthodox Church to remain permanently at the legation
and to send students to Peking to study the Chinese language for the
9
purpose of becoming interpreters for the Russian government. After
this treaty Russian ambassadors had great influence in Peking and
Russian merchants, who were on better terms with the Chinese than
other merchants, gradually received more and more privileges.
Due to this increased influence of the Russians in China and the
development of permanent settlements in Siberia by Russian emigrants
the Russian government began to take a more real interest in the Far
3ast. This interest was greatly intensified when England began to
expand her power in China. As a result of the war between China
and England in 1842, England had forced China to open up five ports
from which Russia was excluded. Previous to 1842 Russia was the
9. Williams, p. 237
-
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only country that had had international agreements with China. As
the power of England increased Russia feared the encroachment of
England or some other European power up in the Amur River territory.
To guard against this possibility Russia sent Nicholas Muraviev to
Eastern Siberia as Governor of the territory. Muraviev was a far-
sighted man and realized the value of further expansion, the necessity
of navigating the Amur, and of gaining control of its outlet to in-
crease the value of the river to Russia. Muraviev, with the aid of
Nevelskoy, who had been appointed head of an expedition to explore the
Amur, continued the expansion. Sakhalin was discovered and occupied
and the mouth of the Amur River was claimed by Russia when Nevelskoy
raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the river, an act which was
10
approved by the Czar in 1850.
Muraviev, who at this time was fearing an attack by France and
England on the Pacific during the Crimean War, used the Amur River to
transport troops, equipment and supplies to the coast. A French
attack from the Pacific was defeated by the Russians and so Muraviev'
s
plan for the control of the Amur had been proven to be practical and
Russian interests in fortifications and in securing navigation of the
Amur increased. From this time on Muraviev determined to gain recti-
fication of the boundary by making the Amur River the frontier line.
10. Yakhontoff, p. 20
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Settlements were made in 1855 on the lower Amur, four on the
11
right bank and one on the left, and by 1853 the river was practi-
cally under Russian control. The next step was to get China to
sanction and recognize the control, so in 1857 Russia sent Admiral
Putiatin to negotiate with Peking authorities on the boundary question.
He was refused admission at Kiakhta and so sailed do^n the Amur and
went by sea to Peiho and Shanghai where at both places he was refused
admission. In spite of this attitude on the part of the Chinese,
iiuraviev continued his explorations and settlements with the final
aim in mind of obtaining more treaties to legalize Russia's new
position in the Far East.
11. Yakhontoff, p. 238

111. RUSSIAN EXPANSION THROUGH FRIENDSHIP AND ALLIANCES, 1858 - 1898
Treaty of Aigun
The treaty of Nerchinsk which had held for 160 years without amend-
ment, had maintained peace between the neighboring countries. Russia,
however, during this period had gradually increased her influence in
China* Russian embassies, the only unite people allowed at Peking,'
1'
had visited the court of China; a Russian market had been established
in Peking where the legation had their headquarters; a Russian church
had been organized and a Russo-Chinese language school to train diplomats
p
had been founded in Peking. Since the treaty of Nerchinsk, Russia had
also taken over the control of the Amur valley as a result of the explor-
ations of Muraviev and Nevelskoy and because of the victories of the
Russians in the Pacific during the Crimean War (1854-1856).
China, on the other hand, was in a much weeker position than Russia
in 1858. She had been defeated by England in the Opium War in 1842 and
in 1858 she was bein^ threatened with another defeat at the hands of
England and France in the second foreign war of 1856-1860. During this
war with England and France, China was also endeavoring to keep control
over the Taiping rebellion (1850-1864) which had threatened to overthrow
3
the dynasty in China.
1. J.W. Hall, -The Revolt of Asia," p. 135
2. Ibid
3. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations, " p. 172
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For these reasons Russia was in a good position to befriend China
and to obtain, as a result, all that Muraviev wished. He had aimed for
some time to get China to sanction Russian control of the territory he
had explored, and to grant Russia the legal right to navigate the Amur
River. As China was in no position to refuse anything while she was
being threatened by the Taiping rebellion at home and the Anglo-French
blockade from outside, Muraviev took the opportunity to propose to
China the first of three treaties which Russia succeeded in obtaining
by 1860. So Muraviev, in the spring of 1858, was askBd by Chinese
officials to confer with Prince Yishan, commander-in-chief of the forces,
and a few days later, in May 1858, the treaty of Aigun was signed.
This treaty gave to Russia the territory on the left, or north bank of
the Amur River from the mouth of the Argun to the mouth of the Amur.
The territory on the right as far as the Ussuri was recognized as
Chinese, but the territory between the Ussuri and the sea, south of the
Amur River, was to be held by both countries until the question of a
boundary could be settled. The Amur, Sungari and the Ussuri rivers
were to be open for navigation to both Russian and Chinese vessels, but
no vessels of other countries were to be allowed to navigate these
rivers. The Manchu inhabitants on the left bank of the Amur were
allowed to be under Chinese authority. Trade across the border was to
be permitted but no regulations were prescribed except that officials
of both countries were to mutually protect traders of Russia and China
4
on either bank of the river. This treaty stimulated the ambition of
4. V.H. Yakhontoff , "Russia and the Soviet Union," p. 352
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Russia for further expansion of her power in the East.
Treaty of Tientsin
The treaty of Aigun had been negotiated by Count Muraviev, governor-
general and administrator of Eastern Siberia, but Putiatin, who had fin-
5
ally arrived at Hongkong, and the representatives of France, England
and America, were negotiating at the seme time for a commercial treaty in
order to acquire privileges of trade by sea. Putiatin desired for Russia
the privilege of trade at the treaty ports which had previously been
opened to the other powers. He was in a better position than the re-
presentatives of other powers far the feeling of the Chinese was less an-
tagonistic toward Russia than toward the French and English, who had been
carrying on military operations in China. Also the treaty of Aigun,which
had just recently been signed, strengthened the position of Putiatin and
so the Russian treaty, signed on June 13, 1858, was the first of the
series of commercial treaties between China and European countries.
By this treaty of Tientsin Russia obtained the right to trade at
Shanghai, iJingpo, loo-chow-fu, Amoy and Canton, all of which had been
opened to other European countries in the treaty of Hanking with England,
6
and in the following treaties with America and France. In addition
to usinf^ these ports, Russia was allowed to trade at Taiwanfu in Formosa
and Kiungchow in Hainan. The treaty confirmed the right of Russia to
send envoys from Kiakhta to Peking by any route through open cities or por
5. See p. 11
6. Treaties between 1842-1844, after Opium War
ts
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of China and due respect was to be shown them on arrival; the Russian
government was given the right to appoint consuls in all ports opened for
trade and could send warships to support the authority of the consuls and
to maintain order among the Russian subjects living in the ports; the
personal safety of Russians living in China, and the security of their
property was guaranteed; no cases arising between Russian and Chinese
subjects in the open ports were to be examined or judged by the Chinese
government except with the cooperation of a Russian consul or a represent-
ative of the Russian government in the district. One other important
7
gain for Russia appeared in Article XII which provided that: "All the
rights political, commercial and other privileges that may in the future
be acquired by the countries most favored by the Chinese Government, shall
be extended to Russia as well, without any further negotiations on her
part. 1* In the following treaties with the other European countries
eleven more ports were opened, tar if Is were revised, and protection pant-
ed for Christian missionaries. These rights, as well as many others in
the European treaties, were granted automatically to Russia because of
this most favored nation clause in Article XII.
While these treaties were being arranged, Count Muraviev had been
surveying the coast of the Ussuri region and soon after the signing of the
treaties the war between China and the foreign powers broke out again.
These two facts led to a third treaty between Russia and China within
three years.
7. Yakhontoff, p. 355.
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Treaty of Peking
The treaties of Tientsin provided for signature at Peking but the
Chinese Commissioners at Shanghai insisted that the ratifications should
be exchanged there. The foreign ministers refused to enter into ne-
gotiations there and started for Peking. When they arrived at Taku
they found that the Russian representatives had already completed the
ratification of their treaty at Peking, but that the forts at the mouth
of the river had been strengthened and the river closed to transporta-
tion by a boom. The Chinese claimed the ministers could reaca Peking
by landing farther up the coast and then going by land across to Peking,
but the British and the Fre:.ch considered the blocking of the river an
insult, and while attempting to remove the obstacles, drew on an attack
from the forts in which the Europeans were defeated. This occurred the
last of June, 1859, and during the rest of the year negotiations were
carried on between England and France resulting in the sending of re-
enforcements for the allies. In March, 1860, the two governments sent
an ultimatum to Peking, but as China absolutely refused the ultimatum,
the foreign war was renewed and the Taku forts captured on August 21,
1860.
Meanwhile Jiuraviev, surveying along the coast of Ussuri, had
selected the site of Vladivostok and had occupied it on July 20, 1860.
Russia, who had been watching for an opportunity, now took advantage of
the situation in China and General Ignatiev, posing as a friend of China,
convinced her that the condition was dangerous and that she ought to
settle the difficulties before the war was carried too far. He also
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urged the foreign powers to withdraw from Peking and then, claiming that
he had saved the dynasty of China, asked her for a recognition of these
services in the form of a signature to a treaty which ceded to Russia
the territory east of the Ussuri River which Muraviev haa alreauy
occupied. Thus Russia had gained, through diplomacy ana no expense, the
valuable territory south of the Amur, called Primorskaya, as well as the
6
port of Vladivostok.
This treaty of Peking,signed in November 1860 by Prince Kung, who
was then in control of the Peking government, ceaed to Russia, besides
the territory east of the Ussuri River, the region adjacent to the lakes
of Balkhash ana Issik-kul. The boundary line between Siberia and Russia
was aajusted anu the Russians were grantea the right to trade in all
parts of the Empire; barter trade was authorized between the citizens of
the two countries along a custom free boundary and the merchants of both
countries were to be given special protection by the local border offi-
cials of both countries; Russian merchants were given the privilege of
traveling from Kiakhta to Peking for commercial purposes and anywhere in
and
China for trading purposes if they had the proper documentsj/the Russian
government might appoint . consuls to Kashgar ana Urga as well as at Hi
and Tarbagati for supervision over the merchants and for the prevention
9
of misunderstandings between merchants and the local population.
8. Morse and MacNair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 229
9. Yakhontoff, p. 357 - 360
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After the signins of the treaty of Peking, Russia built up Vladi-
vostok as a naval base, made the Amur a Russian river by protecting it
with a chain of fortresses, and started colonization on the right bank
of the Ussuri for the region had fertile soil, good harbors and a mild
climate. The colonization, however, was slow due to Russian problems
at home, their conquests and wars in the Near East and in Central Asia,
and to poor transportation.
In gaining possession of the Amur and of the sea coast, Muraviev
completed the work of Yermak who had started Russian expansion through
weatern Siberia. The boundary line fixed by this treaty remained the same
for thirty years, but access to the Pacific brought on a desire for more
ports and during that thirty years Russia, as she turned toward the south,
overstepped the Amur boundary both commercially and politically.
Russia in Kuldja
Soon after Russia had succeeded in gaining territory north of the
Amur River by the treaty of 1860, she again used the same policy of
claiming friendship and giving aid to China in order to try to gain more
territory on another frontier. Sinkiang, between Mongolia and Tibet,
was one of China's western provinces and it had been under Chinese con-
trol for over two hundred years. The territory in this province was
hard to keep intact when the government of China was weak. During the
Taiping Rebellion, 1850-54, rebellions broke out in this province and
in the northern part of Hi under Mohammedan leadership and Yakub-Beg
had become conqueror and ruler of western Turkestan. The central
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government of China could not resist the new control,
Russia was very much interested in the situation as a strong trans-
frontier trade had been built up between Russia and China during the
midale of the nineteenth century at Kuldja ana Tarbagatai. In 1651 a
convention had been signed providing for the presence of a Russian consul
10
ana allowing a Russian settlement in Hi. The agreement also regu-
lateu the trade between Russia ana China, but in 1863 the rise of the
Dungari tribe expelled the Chinese representatives from a large part of
Kashgaria ana then the Insurrection under Yakul-Beg increased and spread.
In 1871, fearing for the safety of their trade, Russia moved troops into
Kuldja and occupied the territory on the ground of anarchy prevailing in
11
Kashgaria ana that it was becoming a menace to Russian interests. At
the same time she aid this, she promised China that the occupation was
temporary ana that the territory wouia be restored to China whenever she
was able to ho id it against the Mohammeaan conquerors; at thr^t time it
seemed improbable that that condition could occur ana Russia seemed to be
getting a strong foot-hold in the Sinkiang province.
However, in 1667 Tso Tsungtang haa been given the task of retaking
the territory that haa been conquered by the Mohammedans. Tso Tsung-tang
was a man of great simplicity but he was a stern aisciplinarian; he was
a great general but used the policy of punishing rebellious cities by
12
carrying on great massacres ana atrocities. For ten years he waged
10. j. P. Bland, "Li Hung-chang," p. 189
11. J. P. Bland, p. 190
12. iuorse ana MacNair, p. 341
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wars and won campaigns which carried him through all of northern Sinkiang,
in which he thenre-es tab li shed Chinese rule, and in July 1878, after
Turkestan hau been reconquered, the Russian government was informed that
China was ready to take over the administration of Hi and that they
were sending an envoy to St. Petersburg to arrange the matter. Russia
,
however, was unwilling to give up her hold on the territory that she had
so easily gained. Russia claimed that China hau been too weak to control
her outlying possessions and that was why it had become necessary to send
in troops to maintain order. The envoy from China, Chunghow, was not a
diplomat and after nine months he came to terms by drawing up the treaty
13
of Livaaia which was signed September 15, 1879. By this treaty Russia
and
was to evacuate Kuldja^yChlnese sovereignty was to be restored, but the
western and richer part of Hi was to be ceded to Russia and she was also
to receive great trading privileges in western China. Her caravans could
go across from Eastern Turkestan into China as far as Hankow without pay-
ment of duties or likin charges. In addition, China was to pay Russia
five million roubles to pay for the expenses of administration uuring
the occupation. Chunghow did not realize the great value of the terri-
tory he hau granted to Russia and when he returned to China, he met with
great opposition because of the treaty he haa made. He was removed from
office ana the opposition grew so strong tnat later he was condemned to
be executed while China refuseu to sign the treaty.
Feeling was very strong in China. ilany favored war as Tso
Tsung-tang haa a strong force of sixty thousand troops trained by the
13. Horse and MacNair, p. 342
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ten years of conquest in Sinkiang and he -was anxious to use them against
the Russians. China bought munitions, hurriedly collected troops and
built up defenses, for Russia also was preparing for war by sending ships
and men to the Chinese coast. But finally a new ambassador was appointed
to Russia. Marquis Tseng, the Chinese ambassador at the Court of St.
James, was ordered to St. Petersburg in July 1880, to try to make new
arrangements with Russia. The new ambassador was in a difficult posi-
tion because of the previous failure of Chtinghow, and because of the divi-
sion of feeling in China between the war party, leu by Prince Chun and
tne Empress Regent, ana the peace party, led by Li Hung-chang, who
14
realized tne strength of Russia. Marquis Tseng first induced China to
lift the punishment of Chunghow, for it would have meant the losing of
the sympathy of all the Powers and it would make Russia more antagonistic,
tnen he reopened negotiations with Russia.
China was conservative and only with difficulty could be made to
15
give up what she regarded as her own territory. China was anxious to
recover Kuldja for it meant that in Russian hands it would be an open
door into Sungari, and although Turkestan itself was not valuable, China's
policy was to surround herself with buffer states for protection against
aggressive neighbors. Russia tendea to be aggressive and refused as long
16
as possible to give up what she had once gained. The problem of
Marquis Tseng was to find a solution which would save the pride of China
14. A.S. Krausse, "Russia in Asia," p. 177
15. R.S. Gundry, "China and her Neighbors," p. 207
16. Ibid., p. 207
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and partly satisfy the demand of Russia.
He informed Russia that the treaty of Chunghow could not be rati-
fied and found the Russian government favorable to further negotiation.
The Chinese demands were reasonable ana Marquis Tseng had good diplomatic
ability; although he had to work under conflicting instructions coming
from the war party and peace party which followed each other in power,
yet after six months he succeeded in obtaining a new treaty, signed Feb-
ruary, 1861. By this Treaty of St. Petersburg, Russia gave back the
valley and the comnand of the passes in Tien-shan and also part of 111.
The trade auvantages Russia hau received by the Treaty of Livadia were
limited. The caravans from Eastern Turkestan could not go on to Hankow
and freedom from duties outside the Great Wall should cease as soon as
the cities had recovered from trouble enough to set up customs houses or
as soon as the trade became large enough to make a customs tariff necess-
ary. Russia was given the right to open up consulates in certain cities
of Turkestan and Mongolia ana in these towns ana trading areas there
shoulu be free trade between Russian and Chinese subjects. Russians had
the right to settle and purchase real estate for the purpose of carrying
on trade. The indemnity China was to pay Russia was increased from five
million to nine million roubles because the Russian occupation of Kuldja
had been prolonged and the cost of occupation had been increased due to
the unsettled condition of the territory.
Marquis Tseng had brought back to China the best part of the terri-
tory Russia had taken and it was considered a "bloodless diplomatic
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triumph." China haa gained through diplomacy rather than war.
Russia, however, still held a strip of Chinese territory in Sinkiang
and she had hau ten years of systematic study of Chinese Turkestan
18
which had teen surveyed by scientists sent from St. Petersburg, and
the indemnity was large. The rights of Russian consuls and subjects
in 111 haa been secured ana t he rights of the traders had been increased.
Russia now turneu her attention toward railway expansion in the
Par East anu lai a the basis of a control which at first aided her peace-
ful economic expansion but later became one of the causes of an
aggressive policy.
Trans-Siberian Railway
During Russian expansion toward the Pacific the rivers of Siberia
had been of great value for both transportation and communicat ion, but
as expansion continued, the colonists settled farther south where the
territory was more fertile and the climate more favorable, ana this
brought about the necessity of better connections by roads. luring
the early part of the eighteenth century postal roads were in use in
Western Siberia anu fortnightly service was established between Moscow
ana Tobolsk, but in Eastern Siberia the conditions of the country were
not so favorable to the development of communication; more hilly
country and marsh lands presented obstacles to road building while Lake
Baikal, which it was necessary to cross if a water route was developed,
17. Morse and MacNair, p. 344
18. Krausse, p. 178
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was subject to severe storms. By the middle of the nineteenth cent-
ury projects were being suggested for the building of railways to aid
communication in the East, but plans for long lines were given up and only
short lines for commerce were built. During the last half of the cent-
ury lines had been built to connect the navigable rivers, and by 1884 a
20
rail and water route was complete as far as Tiumen, but due to frozen
conditions during the winter and the many reloadings that were necessary,
it did not prove to be a very valuable economic project.
A plan for a Trans -Siberian railway was drawn up as early as 1858
but lack of capital and initiative had prevented any development of the
scheme. In 1890 the idea of a railway extending all the way across
Siberia was a^ain suggested. The necessity for transportation to the
Pacific seemed greater than before for the Amur and the Ussuri terri-
tories had been taken by Russia, Vladivostok had been built up, and
petitions were being presented to the Czar to have European Russia
connected with the Pacific by railway. After favorable reports had
been presented to the Czar he appointed a commission to consider the re-
commendations. As the Congress of Berlin had recently blocked Russian
expansion toward the Mediterranean, the Czar favored the project and in
1891 quite willingly issued a rescript to build the railway.
The railway was to be built by dividing the route into seven
sections and work was to be started at both ends at once. The Ussuri
19. Vladimir, "Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway,"
pp. 273-274
20. Vladimir, p. 290
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branch was easy to build and was completed by 1895; the first section
at the European end was completed by 1896; and by 1899 trains were
running as far as Irkutsk, a distance of 3500 miles from St. Peters-
burg.
The aim of building the line was not only to develop trade and
the natural resources of Siberia, but to further the Russian policy on
the Pacific, for the completion of the railway would give to Russia a
commanding place in the growing struggle for supremacy in the Far East.
The railway also led to a still greater desire for expansion for, after
building the Ussuri branch, and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese
War, Russia felt the great handicap of trying to depend upon Vladivos-
tok, which was not open the year round, for a naval harbor. This situ-
ation led her to look farther south to Port Arthur for an ice-free port
and caused her to watch with serious interest the outcome of the Sino-
Japanese War. If Japan should defeat China she might take Port Arthur
and gain a valuable foothold in Manchuria.
Sino-Japanese War
In the spring of 1894 domestic strife in Korea attracted the atten-
tion of both China and Japan. Japan proposed to China that the two
powers cooperate in an effort to reorganize Korean government. China
refused, but Japan notified China of her intention to act alone. The
situation became more serious, Japan strongly favored progressive re-
form while China opposed progressive reform and favored a conservative
21. Krausse, p. 209
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government in Korea. This conflict of policies between the two countries
eventually brought on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. During the
war Japan captured the fortress of Port Arthur and finally China was
obliged to sue for peace.
China intrusted Li Hung-chang with the responsibility of securing
the best terms possible from Japan and the treaty of Shimonoseki was
signed April 17, 1895. By this treaty China was to recognize the in-
dependence of Korea. She was to cede to Japan the full sovereignty
of Formosa, the Pescadores Islands and the part of Manchuria east of
the Liao River, which was called the Liaotung Penninsula. China was to
pay to Japan an indemnity of 200 million taels. She was also to open
four more treaty ports, Shasi, Chungking, Suchow and Hangchow, and open
22
to traffic the waterways leading to the ports. The treaty was rati-
fied at Chefoo on May 8. A later treaty of commerce, provided for in
the treaty of April, 1895, was signed at Peking, July 21, 189S. This
treaty included the most-favored-nation clause, or the granting to
Japan of all rights that had been granted to any of the Western Powers.
It gave to Japan the right to carry on trade, industry and manufactur-
ing at any treaty port.
The intervention of Japan in Korea and China encouraged and paved
the way for further Russian aggression. Count Witte felt, that if
Japan succeeded in establishing herself on the mainland as she aimed to
do in the treaty of Shimonoseki, she would block his policy of peaceful
22. Morse and MacNair, p. 407
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penetration, undermine the achievements of the previous century and
threaten the future of Russia in the Far East. Russia had long desired
the Liao-tung Penninsula and if Japan should succeed in taking this terri-
tory Russia would be pushed northward to the Siberian ports, which were
not open go trade during the winter season. It would be best for
Russian interests to have a strong, but passive China, but to maintain
this condition China would have to remain unchanged in territory and no
23
power could be allowed to increase its territorial possessions in China.
Count Witts, therefore, convinced the Czar that Russia could not afford
to allow Japan to get a foothold on the continent. While Russia was
probably not intending at this time to take all Manchuria, she saw
the possibility of a partition of China by the Great Powers and deter-
mined to prevent Japan or any other aggressive power from acquiring terri-
24
tory that bordered on her newly started Trans-Siberian railway. So
the Czar took definite steps to interfere with the settlement made in
the Shimonosekl Treaty by calling a special committee on Sino-Japanese
affairs. On March 30, 1895 this committee drew up the following con-
clusions:^^
(1) To seek to preserve the status quo
ante bellum in northern China and in pursuance
of this to advise Japan, at first amicably, to
desist from the occupation of southern Manchuria,
for such an occupation would injure our interests
and would be a constant menace to the peace of the
23. Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 83
24. G.N. Steiger, "China and the Occident," p. 47
25. Witte, p. 84
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Par East; in case of Japan*s refusal to
follow our advice, to declare to the
Japanese Government that we reserve to
ourselves freedom of action anu that we
shall act in accordance with our interests.
(2) To issue an official statement to
the European Powers anu to China to the
effect that while on our part we do not
seek any seizures, we deem it necessary,
for the protection of our Interests, to
insist on Japan's desisting from the occu-
pation of southern Manchuria.
Prince Lobanov realized that Russia could not interfere alone
successfully, so he suggested interference to the European powers on the
plea that the Japanese possession of Manchuria would menace the security
of capital invested in China and endanger the policiesof the European
nations in China. England, who had earlier suggested interference, now
refused, but France and Germany joined to make up the Three Power In-
tervention. In initiating the Three Power Intervention, Russia, who
hau been more successful than other countries in maintaining cordial
diplomatic relations with the court of Peking, used her previous policy
of posing as a friend to China and prevented Japan from acquiring a
part of Chinese territory. This aiu to China, Russia stressed later
when she wished payment for this intervention.
In April, between the signing of the treaty of Shimonoseki and
its ratification, the Russian, German and French governments presented
to the Japanese foreign office notes stating that it would be dangerous
to the peace of the Far East for her to take the Liaotung Penninsula
and strongly auvising her to give up the claim to the Manchurian terri-
tory. Meanwhile Russian, French anu German warships hau been enter-
i?9
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ing eastern waters ready for action and Russia was preparing to mo-
bilize her army. The demand was not entirely unexpected by Japan as
two Japanese leaders, Count Ito and Count Matsu, hau. auvised against
taking the territory in the first place but had been obliged to give
26
in to the military party. It was impossible for Japan to stand out
against these aemands as they felt the Powers were prepared to enforce
their auvice if necessary. Japan was exhausted by her campaigns ana her
financial resources hau been arained so she was obliged to accept the
terms and sign a new agreement. By this agreement signed on November
6, 1895, Japan exchanged the Llaotung Penn insula, with all fortifications,
arsenals ana public property, for an Increase in the indemnity of 30
million taels, making a total indemnity of 230 million taels. This
treaty was ratified at Peking on November 29, 1895.
Russia and France saw no reason why they could not yain diplomatic
influence in China as a result of their interference and the chance
came when China hau to meet the payment of the indemnity. Count Witte,
again posing as a friena of China, ana loyally supported by Prince
Lobanov, offered the services of Russia to China by making a loan to
help Chili,* pay her indemnity. An agreement was signed on July 6, 1895
between the Russian Ministry of Finances and a group of six French and
four Russian banks, to make to China a thirty-six year loan of 400
million francs at four per cent interest. The loan was to be secured
by Russian resources and Count Witte arrangeu for the transaction on
26. Morse anu MacNair, p. 408
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the French money market. He promised the banks that in return he would
27help them in financial activities in China, Russia was now in a
position to carry out her aggressive policy by demanding a return for
her aid to China in the Three Power Intervention and for her loan to
help China financially.
Rus so-Chinese Bank
The Sino-Japanese War had shown the military inefficiency of the
Chinese and how keen the competition among the Powers for concessions
anu spheres of interest was becoming. Russia was the first country
to take a nevr step to gain power in China; she aid this by forming the
Rus80-Chinese Bank. It was done partly to fulfill the promise made
to France to help the banks which hau aided in making the loan to
China anu partly to help the exploitation of the situation in the Far
28
East in the interest of Russia. Throu§£i the bank, Russia had a
chance to gain railway and mining rights in iSanchuria. This exploit-
ation was later called the conquest by "bank ana railway."
Count Wltte was very influential in founding this bank which was
chartered by Russia under Russian laws in December, 1895, but which
had as its chief shareholders, French financiers. Thus the Bank was
nominally a Russian corporation, but the real founders were four of
the banks of Paris and many of the financial leaaers of Fr-ince. The
27. V/itte, p. 85
26. H. Parlett, "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Manchuria,"
P. T
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bank started with a capital of 11,250,000 roubles and the Chinese govern-
ment made a permanent investment of 5,000,000 taels.
The President of the Bank was Chinese, but he was a mere figure-
head. The charter provided for a Board of Directors of eleven, to be
elected by the shareholders ana confirmed by the Minister of Finance
of Eussia>and for the Managing Directors, who were to be chosen from
the Board of Directors. The active managers were mostly Russians
under the supervision and direction of Count V/itte and his finance de-
29
partment. Branches of the Bank could be established in Russia or
operating
abroad. The bank was to begin/six months after the sanction of the char-
ter and was to continue indefinitely.
The aims of the Russo-Chinese Bank were to develop commercial re-
lations with the Eastern Asiatic countries and its powers were very
broaa. It could discount commercial paper, receive deposits, buy and
sell goods and stock, collect duties for the Chinese Empire, could coin
money with the authority of the Chinese government, pay loans of the
Chinese government and acquire concessions for the establishment of the
construction of railways and telegraph lines in China.
"It may be said that the bank was created to take advantage of the
more favorable relations createu between Russia anu China resulting from
30
the intervention and Russia's guaranty of the Chinese loan."
Both Russia and China invested heavily in the bank at first but
29. S.A.Korff , "Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half
Century," p. 58
30. P.H.Clyde, "International Rivalries in Manchuria," p. 49
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later, private holders took a large share of stock and French investors,
who were gaining profits from Russian investments and desired more,
held the majority of shares. The bank was later amalgamated with the
Banque du Nord under the new name of the Russo-Asiatic Bank.
Russo-Chinese Secret Treaty, 1896
Li Hung-chang, who was the virtual head of the Chinese Foreign
Office, had been in office in Tientsin for over thirty years. He had
come in contact with all persons having business with the government.
"His ability in handling foreign affairs was universally recognized. n
"In the field of diplomacy, so far as the European Govern-
ment's representatives were concerned, Li was to all intents and pur-
31
poses the Chinese Government personified." In 1895 at the suggestion
of Count I to of Japan, Li Hung-chang was appointed envoy to that country
32
to settle the question of peace after the Sino-Japanese War. The
Czar of Russia later sent a personal request to the Chinese Sraperor
asking him to entrust Li Hung-chang with the position of Embassador and
in March, 1896, Li was appointed to represent China at the coronation
of the Czar at Moscow. It v/as during this visit to Russia that the
Li-Lobanov Secret Treaty of May, 1896 was signed.
Li Hung-chang, since the Sino-Japanese War, was generally afraid
of the antagonism of Japan, but did not fear Russia and preferred to
depend on Russian help. The menace of Japanese aggression was more
31. Bland, p. 77
32. Ibid, p. 179
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formidable than that of Russia so Russia was new in an ideal position
to capitalize the aid and friendship which she had recently given to
China. Count Witte*s plan was to secure from China the right to con-
tinue the Trans-Siberian Railway, vitich had been completed as far as
Transbaikalia by 1896, straight across Manchuria. He felt that this
branch would be more economical and much less difficult to construct
while the Amur branch, which had been planned, would not only be too
expensive, but would also build up too much competition for the Amur
Steamship Company. The shorter route would also possess the advantage
of passing through a more productive area and more favorable climate
which would give Russia great economic advantages. Witte's problem
was to get China* s permission for the plan by a peaceful agreement
based on mutual commercial interests for he had always upheld the idea
that the Trans-Siberian Railway had no military or political designs
but was planned as a purely economic enterprise and should, under no
circumstances, be allowed to serve as a means for territorial expansion.
At the coronation of the Czar, therefore, Count Witte, after re-
minding Li Hung-chang of Russia's recent service to his country, tried
to convince him that, as the integrity of China might at any time be
threatened by Japanese aggression, a railway across Manchuria would be
absolutely necessary if Russia was to render assistance to China. He
also argued that the railway from Chita to Vladivostok would help
solve the problem of poor tran sporat ion in Manchuria and in addition
33. Witte, p. 87
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would help China by raising the productivity of the territory,
Li Hung-chang, realizing the dangers of the proposal, was unwill-
ing to agree. He knew this agreement would open up Manchuria to
Russian economic and political penetration and he realized the real
aim of Russia was not to defend China against Japan but to extend
Russian interests in Manchuria. However, after the Three Power Inter-
vention, HLi*s diplomacy in relation to Japan was framed and dominated
34
by the obligations which he had incurred towards Russia." Feeling
also that if Japan was to be restrained from further attacks upon
Manchuria, Russia must be given a strong foothold and strategic ad-
vantages in that territory and having been given assurance from
Russia that the territorial integrity of China would be preserved,
Li Hung-chang finally agreed to the three main points that Russia
desired; (1) that Russia might build the railway across Manchuria
from Chita to Vladivostok, but it must be done by a private company;
(2) that China would cede to Russia strip of land sufficient for
the construction and operation of the railway; and (3) that the
two countries were to come to the defense of each other in case Japan
35
should threaten the territory or the possessions of Russia. Prince
Lobanov was entrusted with the responsibility of drawing up the final
treaty. This treaty was a secret defensive alliance for a period of
fifteen years and was aimed mainly toward Japan. It was signed in
36
May, 1896, and was called the Li -Lobanov Secret Treaty.
34. Bland, p. 183
35. K.S. Weigh, "Russo-Chinese Diplomacy," p. 61
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Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896*
Article I. Any aggression ulrected by
Japan against the Russian territory in Eastern
Asia, or territory of China or that of Korea
shall be considered as necessitating the
immediate application of the present treaty.
In such case the two High Contracting
Parties engage to support reciprocally each
other with all the land and sea forces they
may be able to dispose of at that moment
(lit. "don't elles pourraient disposer en ce
moment et a s'entr'aider autant que possible
pour le ravitailleraent de leurs forces res-
pectives."
)
Article II. As soon as the two High Con-
tracting Parties shall be engaged in a common
action, no treaty of peace with the adversary
may be concluded by either without the consent
of the other.
Article III. IXiring military operations
all Chinese ports shall be open, when necess-
ary, to the warships of Russia, which shall
find there any assistance of the Chinese
authorities they may require.
Article IV. In order to facilitate for
the Russian lana forces access to the points
under menace anu to assure the means of
existence, the Chinese Government consents
to the construction of a railway across the
Chinese provinces of Amur and Kirin in tho
direction of Vlauivostok.
The junction of tnls railway with the
railways of Russia shall not serve as a
pretext for any encroachment on Chinese
territory, nor for an attempt against the
sovereign rights of His Majesty the Emperor
of China. The construction and exploitation
of this railway shall be accorded to the
Russo-Chinese Bank ana the clauses of the
contract which shall be concluded to that
effect, shall be duly discussed by the Minis-
ter of China at St. Petersburg and by the
Russo-Chinese Bank.
Article V. It is understood that in case
of war foreseen by the Article I, Russia shall
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be free to use tiiB railway mentioned in
Article 17 for tbs transportation and pro-
visioning of her troops. In peace time
Russia shall have the same right for the
transportation and provisioning of her
troops, with the right to stop over for no
purpose other than those justified by the
necessity of transportation.
Translated from the French text of the
original consulted in the Archives of the
Narcomindiel (Foreign Office) at Moscow.
The benefits from this treaty were decidedly in the hands of the
Russians. The agreement was really a charter which gave to Russia a
free hand in Manchuria for it gave her a power great enough to almost
annex Manchuria as part of the Russian Empire. By the end of 1897
there was hardly a town in Manchuria but what had Russian outposts.
Li Hung-chang has been accused by some of cowardice and treason because
of his conciliatory methods and his seeming favoritism towards Russia
in the terms of the agreement, but his decisions were based on his
definite appreciation of China's incapacity to resist attack. Bland
37
says, "He was never too proud, but only too wise, to fight."
The treaty of 1896 did not come to light until the Washington Con-
ference, but it lost its meaning during the Boxer uprising because of
further Russian aggression. If Russia had observed its provisions the
38
Russo-Japanese War mi ht not have taken place.
Chinese Eastern Railway
The Railway across Manchuria developed into a most effective in-
37. Bland, p. 88
38. Morse and MacNair, p. 415 footnote
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strument for the expansion of Russian influence in Northern China.
Witte desired friendship with China, for he felt that it would be
the best policy for Russia, ana cooperation with China in Manchurian
railway development would be an effective way to bring about that
feeling. He made an agreement with the Russo-Chinese Bank for it to
cede the concession to construct the railway, from the city of Chita
to the Russian South Ussuri Railway, to the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company which would be formed for that purpose. This agreement was
signed September 8 f 1896.
By the terms of this agreement, the Bank was to establish a
39
company with a capital of five million roubles, which was to be
calleu the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, organized under the
Russian laws and whose statutes were to be confirmed by the Czar. The
President of the Company was to be named by the Chinese government;
he was to reside in Peking, but was to be paid by the company. His
duties were to see that the Bank ana the Railway Company fulfilled
their obligations to the Chinese government; he was also responsible
for the relations of th> Bank anu the Railway Company with the Chinese
government ana with the Central and local authorities. The shareholders
40
must be cither Russian or Chinese.
The construction of the railway was to begin twelve months from
date of contract and finished within six years. The guage of the line
was to be five feet, the width of the Russian railways. The Chinese
39. H.B.lIorse, "International Relations of the Chinese Empire,"
v. 3, p. 83
40. V/.W.V/illoughby, "Foreign Rights and Interests in China," p. 422
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government was to assume responsibility for the protection of the road
and of the employees, but all criminal cases were to be settled by local
authorities. The Chinese government was to order local authorities to
assist the Company in obtaining materials and in making transportation
easier. All lana necessary for construction work, and any land in the
vicinity needed for securing raw material was to be given to the company,
free of charge, if they belonged to the state, ana if private, upon pay-
ment to the owner. These lands belonging to the Company, and all the
41
income of the Company, woula be exempt from taxes.
The Company was to have absolute right of the administration of the
area belonging to it, could build any buildings necessary and could con-
struct anu operate all telegraph lines needed by the company. In the
statutes, according to which the Russian government granted a charter
to the Company on December 4, 1896, the preservation of law and order on
the lands was to be under the control of police agents appointed by the
Company. After thirty-six years China could purchase the line and
eighty years after completion of the line it would automatically become
Chinese property.
An Imperial Ukase of 1901 made provision for the establishment of
Russian juuicial officials within the area of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way. They were to have jurisdiction over matters arising between
42
Russian subjects exclusively in criminal and civil matters.
41. G.H.Blakeslee, "The Pacific Area," p. 200
42. Willoughby, p. 158
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The Chinese Eastern Railway Company was organized during the
early part of 1897 and the first work was done on the railroad across
Manchuria in August, 1897. By 1904 Russia had the following railways
in Manchuria: "West to east, Manchouli-Harbin-Suifenho , 950 miles;
north to south, Harbin-Tali enwan-Port Arthur, 646 miles - a total of
1596 miles" "The main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway was
completed in 1904. Approximately 1,000 miles of this line crossed
43
Manchuria." This route across Manchuria was 568 miles shorter than
the Amur route.
In obtaining the concession for building the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way, Russia had received an important grant which gave her great con-
trol in Manchuria and has in recent years caused many international
disputes. The majority of the shares were in the hands of the
Russians; as the President was merely a figurehead, the actual control
was in the hands of the Russians. Under the clause allowing policing
to be done by the agents of the Company, Russian troops were stationed
along the line, extensive barracks were built for the Russian army of
occupation which was supposed to be protecting the railroad, and
police centers were established which later grew up into settlements.
Harbin developed from one of these police centers44 as the population
began to depend more and more upon the military forces for protection.
The Russian government held the Railway Company in their hands by the
provision which gave them the right to examine all the statutes. The
43. Morse and MacNair, p. 416 footnote
44. R.R.Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," p. 140
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property was free from taxes and the company could transport troops
over the railroad. All this was disguised annexation of China for
Russia was preparing to exercise a political control wi thin the railway
zone and knew China could not resist as Russia maintained armed forces
along the railway line. It was on the provisions in this agreement
of 1895 that Russia, and later Japan, based their political jurisdiction
45
in Manchuria.
45. Willoughby, p. 423



IV. THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OP THE MILITARISTIC PARTY OF RUSSIA ANL ITS
RESUUTS, 1898 - 1905
Talcing of Port Arthur
The period beginning in 1698 started with an aggressive foreign
policy led by the war party. This policy of obtaining power in China
through concessions was similar to that of other countries at that
time, but the Russian leaders carried it so far that eventually it led
to disaster in the Russo-Japanese Y7ar of 1904-1905.
After the Three Power Intervention all three countries, Russia,
France anu. Germany, looked for reward. During the years between 1895-
1697 France ana Russia haa been rewarded in the benefits they had re-
ceived from the Rus so -Chinese Bank ana Chinese Eastern Railway. Ger-
many was also anxious to reap some reward for her share in the Inter-
vention. As early as September, 1695, Germany was considering the
lease of Klaochow, which was valuable as a commercial and strategical
point. In 1697 she informed Austria, Russia ana Italy of he r intention
it as
to acquire/a naval base in China. This would be an unwelcome move for
Russia for she haa intended to eventually claim this territory for her
own purposes.
Count V/itte relates in his Memoirs that the Kaiser of Germany and
the Czar of Russia were out driving ana the Kaiser askeu the Czar if he
would object to Germany taking Kiaochow for a base for German shipping.
He desireu the Czar's consent before he took it. Count Witte had little
doubt but that the Czar found it impossible to refuse and the Kaiser

took It as consent*
Germany now waited for the opportune moment to seize the terri-
tory. This came on November 1. 1897, when two German missionaries were
murdered at the village of Kiachwang. German warships had been off
the coast of China during the summer and autumn and were prepared for
action. On November 14 a German force expelled the Chinese garrison
from Tsingtau, the port at the mouth of Kiaochow Bay, seized the forts
and occupied the port. On March 6, 1696 a convention was signed at
Peking by which China leased to Germany for ninety-nine years the land
on both sides of Kiaochow Bay, including Tsingtau.
After the taking of Kiaochow by the Germans, Count Muravlev, the
Russian foreign minister, auvocated the taking of Port Arthur as this
would be an ice-free port on the coast of her sphere of influence.
Witte strongly opposed this move not knowing at the time of the
arrangement that had been concluded between the Kaiser and the Czar.
Count Witte had been very Influential ir framing the treaty of
1896 and in receiving a grant from China to build the Chinese Eastern
Railway across Manchuria. He realized the uanger of possible future
trouble with Japan and also saw failure for his policy of peaceful
economic penetration in Manchuria. Such a policy would alter the
character of the Chinese Eastern Railway from a peaceful advance for
commercial reajons into a political and aggressive policy. Through
1. Witte, "Memoirs of Count Witte," p. 410
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7/itte's work an industrial development haa been created which he
hoped would raise Russia from an agricultural state to a higher plane
2
of development. He hau put into operation a plan of pacific con-
quest of Manchuria by means of industrial and conmercial penetration
and the success of his life work depended upon peace with other coun-
tries, especially Japan. If Port Arthur were taken by Russia ana a
naval commander given extensive powers, he felt that his plans would
be interfered with and his monopolized sphere of control through the
Russo -Chinese bank and the Chinese Eastern Railway would be ended.
Count Witte also opposed the taking of Port Arthur because he said
it would be treachery to seize territory from a country with whom a
defensive alliance had been made. He says in his Memoirs,"I re-
minded my hearers that we had declareu the principle of China's terri-
torial integrity anu that on the strength of that principle we
forceu Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung Penninsula."
In Russia, however, each of the ministers of the state worked
independently and received authority for his acts from the Czar per-
sonally and at this time Count Witte's influence was less than the
Influence of other ministers. The Czar was now under the influence
of liuraviev who succeeded in making the Czar fear that the British
ships that were in the vicinity would take Port Arthur if Russia
uidnH take it. So the Czar sanctioned the seizure of Port Arthur
2. R.R. Rosen, "Forty Years of Diplomacy," p. 198
3. Witte, p. 99
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which the Three Power Intervention had recently forced Japan to give
up. The Russian squadron was ordered to Port Arthur with the inten-
tion of occupying the Port. During December, 1897, the Russian
squadron arrived at Port Arthur and occupied it although Russia de-
clared she had no intention of infringing on the suzerafaty of China
but would withdraw when the danger was over.
In January, 1698, General Alexey Kuropatkin became Minister of
Warand he demanded the \shole of the Kwantung Penninsula. China hesi-
tated but was too weak to resist and being assured by Russia that the
4
occupation was only a protective measure against other powers, she
signed on March 27, 1898, the first of two conventions, and on March 29
the Russian flag was raised at Port Arthur. The agreement was made by
Li Hung- chang and Chang Yin-hwan, the Russian charge of affairs. Accord-
ing to Count Witte's orn statement Russia paid both officials for draw-
5ing up the agreement. Li Hung-chang received five hundred thousand
6
roubles ana Chang Yin-hwan two hundred fifty thousand roubles.
By this agreement of March 27, 1898, Russia obtained a twenty-
five year lease on Port Arthur ana Dalny with the adjacent waters and
islands, but the lease was not to effect the soverign rights of China.
Within the leased territory Chinese citizens could continue to live
but no Chinese troops should be stationed there. A neutral zone of
4. K.S. Weigh, "Rus so-Chinese Diplomacy p# 79
5. Witte, p. 105
6. Morse ana MacNalr, "Far Eastern International Relations,'* p.427
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about sixty miles, which was to be under Chinese jurisdiction, was
closed to Chinese troops. Port Arthur was to be an exclusive naval
port for the use of Russian and Chinese ships only. Dalny, however,
with the exception of the part used entirely for naval purposes, was
to be a trauing port open to all nations. The agreement provided that
the contract of 1896 was to be extended to cover a branch line from
Port Arthur anc. Jalny, to connect these two ports with Harbin on the
Chinese Eastern Railway, but the clause in Article VIII closed with the
words, "Consent to the construction of the railway on the basis indi-
cated shall never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of
Chinese territory or for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of
7
China."
On May 7, 1898, Russia maoe another agreement which defined the
boundary of the leased territory. Within this leased territory no
ports should be open to trade of other nations and no economic con-
cessions coula be made to other nations without Russia's consent.
On July 6, 1896 a new agreement was signed between Russia or
the Chinese Eastern Railway, and China, concerning the southern branch
of the railway which was to connect the new lease with Russian terri-
tory. The name of this branch was to be the Southern Uanchurlan
Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Permission was granted to the
company to cut timber on government lands and to mine coal in the rail-
7. Manchuria, "Treaties and Agreements," p. 43
<
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wayarea for the use of the company in building the road. It was also
agreed that the company might at its pleasure open a line of sea-going
vessels for the purpose of securing and transporting the necessary
freight, workmen and other necessities needed during the construction
of the railway. Within the leased territory Russia wa3 to fix the
customs tariff, while China was to retain the right to levy ana collect
duties at boundaries on goods moving between the leased area and the
interior. China might arrange with Russia for Russia to establish
customs at Palny and to appoint the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to
act as agent of the Chinese Imperial Board of Revenue to manage Customs
and collect duties for China, but the Customs was to be under the con-
trol of Peking g overnment.
Count \7itte says in his Memoirs, "The Chinese Eastern Railway was
designed exclusively for cultural and peaceful purposes, but jingoist
auventurers turned it into a means of political aggression involving
the violation of treaties, the breaking of freely given promises and
6
the disregard of the elementary interests of other nationalities."
Yet after the agreements were signed, Witte hastened to construct the
branch line from Harbin toPort Arthur and Dalny, the leading commercial
port of the Far East. The Railway now supplied military equipment,
transported troops ana the company financed military enterprises. A
naval fortress was built at Port Arthur ana supply depots were estab-
lished. The occupation of Port Arthur completed Russia's hold on the
8. Witte, p. 102

- 49 -
province of Manchuria. It supplied her with a base and put her In
command of the naval approaches to Its port*
Russia had now reached a position to dominate Llanchurla and
North China.
Open Door Policy
British capitalists whose trade had been cut off by the building
of the branch railway line to Port Arthur received a new concession
from China for an extension of her railroau in North China, but Russia
protested against this expansion of British interests. Russia and
Great Britain, however, came to terms by drawing up the Anglo-Russian
9
railway agreement of April 28, 1899.
1. Great Britain engages not to seek
for her own account, or on behalf of British
subjects or of others, any railway concessions
to the North of the Great Wall of China, and
not to obstruct, directly or indirectly,
applications for railway concessions in that
region supported by the Russian Government.
2. Russia, on her part, engages not to
seek for her own account, or on behalf of
Russian subjects, or of others, any railway
concessions in the basin of the Yangtze,
ana not to obstruct, airectly or indirectly,
applications for railway concessions in that
region supported by the British Government.
Friendship between China and Russia was strengthened by an ex-
change of notes with Peking, June, 1899. This reasserted the right
of China to construct all railways north and northeast of Peking with
Chinese capital ana unaer Chinese supervision. Russia, however, was
9. ti.V.A. MacMurray, "Treaties ana Agreements with and Concerning
China, 1894-1911, " v. 1, p. 204
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to have the first chance, if any outsider was asked for financial aid
and no other government was to be allowed to construct railways.
This process of making international agreements over Chinese
territory and carving out spheres of influence and economic concessions,
led to a declaration of the Open Door Policy by United States. Inter-
national jealousies began in the mludle of the eighties in the growing
rivalry and conflicts between nations who haa begun to gain footholds
in China.
Englanu had obtained Hongkong in 1842, and Northern Burma in
1686. France, in aiming to advance the religious cause in 1663 and
1884, gained control of Annam anu Tonking ana became a danger to China
on the south. In the north Russia had gained in 1681 western parts
of 111 and was an increasingly menacing power. In 1861 Japan had ac-
quired the Liuchiu Islands and in 1895 increased her influence in
10
Korea. China's war with Japan in 1894 and 1695 revealed the weak-
ness of China as she had been defeated previously only by Western
Powers. Tnis defeat increased the scramble of the European nations for
territory before China should fall to pieces. Germany, in 1897, seized
Kiaochow and acquired its lease for 99 years. Russia, who had received
the right to build the Siberian railway to Vladivostok, seized Port
Arthur and received a lease of the port for 25 years. Prance demanded
and received a 99-year lease of Kwangchow. Englanu gained a lease of
Kowloon Penninsula, opposite Hongkong anu a lease of T7elhaiwel, one
of China's most Important naval and land bases, for as long a period
10. E.T. WUllams, "History of China," pp. 344-352
•
==========
51 -
as Russia held Port Arthur.
This territorial aggression of the European nations developed into
the policy of spheres of interest. Opportunities for investment
appeared and capital was attracted by the chance for profits. The
leased territories or spheres of interest became regions far exploit-
ation by the European country holding the lease. Using these spheres
of interest as bases, the foreign countries reached out and extended
their control over inland territory by railway building. A scramble
for railway concessions followed. Russia, France, Germany and Great
Britain secured rights from China to build railways extending inland
from their spheres of interest. United States and Belgium also obtained
concessions for railway building. Requests for raining concessions
followed the right to build railroads. First option in loans in their
individual spheres of interest were demanded by the foreign countries
and the control of China began to be a conquest by "bank and railway.
"
In order to defend and protect their position in the "Far East
the European nations began to secure from China promises never to cede
certain designated areas to any other power. Existence of these
spheres of interest depended on their recognition not only by China,
but by all other powers, so the next step to make their position more
secure was to get recognition of the spheres of influence by rival
powers by making international treaties with them. Treaties were
concluded between Great Britain and France in 1896, Great Britain and
Germany, 1898, Great Britain and Russia in 1899 agreeing on rights,
11. Morse and MacNair
, pp. 425-428
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boundaries, and the recognition of the spheres of influence of each
country.
Spheres of interest did not include any political power. They
were supposed to be simply concessions where a dominant power had
priority rights in economic development. The principle of the open
door recognized the vested rights and special interests as long as a
certain amount of opportunity for others was preserved. However,
China regarded them as an attack on the independence of China. The
Powers soon began to demand exclusive rights and they gained complete
control of industries and communication. This violated the principle
of equal opportunity of trade. The Powers also began to gain politi-
cal power by building up rival economic areas which threatened the in-
tegrity and independence of China. If China was to be prevented from
a final break-up and division between the Poirers, it was time for some
one to take a definite stand and get all nations to a^ree to observe a
definite policy on which to base their expansion in China.
England was the first to become alarmed at the situation. During
the battle for concessions many of the British leaders had argued far
the open door and advocated methods by which the policy would be secure.
En_J.and was more interested in the open door because she had interests
in every Chinese port and did not wish to see any port closed to her
trade. England strongly advocated the policy as long as she was the
predominant power, but with the growing Russian advance in the north,
she soon drifted into a passive policy and did not try to enforce the
policy although she still held the desire to keep China intact. After
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her sphere of interest was established in the Yangtze Valley she could
not consistently preach an open door, so it was left to United States
to formulate and advance a definite policy.
During the last part of the year 1899, Secretary Hay sent out notes
to London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, Rome and Paris. He hoped to
get all countries that hau spheres of interest to support the declaration
that eacn one in its own Sph9«:
12
First — Will in no wise interfere with
any treaty port or any vested interest within
any so-called "sphere of interest" or leased
territory it may have in China.
Secona — That the Chinese treaty tariff
of the time being shall apply to all mer-
chandise landed or shipped to all such ports
as are within said "sphere of interest"
(unless they be "free ports"), no matter
to what nationality it may belong, and that
duties so leviable shall be collected by
the Chinese government.
Third — They will levy no higher harbor
dues on vessels of another nationality fre-
quenting any port in such "sphere" than shall
be levied on vessels of its own nationality,
and no higher railroad charges over lines
built, controlled, or operated within its
"sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens
or subjects of other nationalities trans-
ported through such "sphere" than shall be
levied on similar merchandise belonging to
its own nationality transported over
equal distances.
All the Powers answered favorably saying that they would agree to
the policy on the condition that other countries would do the same.
Russia claimed that she had alreauy demonstrated the policy of the
12. Manchurian treaties, p. 56
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open door by creating Dalny a free port. She said she had no intention
of claiming any special privileges. On March 20, 1900, Secretary Hay
sent a notice to all the countries stating that similar action had
been taken by all the various powers who had spheres of interest in
China and on July 30, 1900, the principle of the Open Door Doctrine
was declared.
The Boxer Uprising
The foreign aggression in China, however, hau been causing a
strong anti-foreign feeling in that country. The policy of the
Chinese government at this time of Increasing local military bands
causea this int i-foreign group in China, as well as the foreigners, to
feel that the government was preparing for war. The Powers began to
increase their forces ana this in turn aroused the natives to the point
13
of open trouble.
This Boxer uprising, as it was calleu, gave Russia, who took ad-
vantage of the situation, a chance to Increase her forces in Manchuria.
During the early part of the uprising Russia continued her policy of
aggressive but peaceful control on a large scale. Count Muraviev
maintained an optimistic attitude about the whole trouble even after
the railway communication between Peking anu Tientsin hau been cut off
and the Boxers haa entered Peking.
^
4 The taking of the Taku forts by
the allies, caused the Anti-foreign feeling to flame up all over China
13. Morse and MacKair, p. 455
14. X. Asakawa, "Russo-Japanese Conflict," p. 141
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and the uprisings spreau to Manchuria. Count Lamsdorff , who had
succeeded Muraviev after his death, sent troops to deal vrith the
trouble and to protect the railroau, for property ana supplies were
being destroyed. The methods used by the Russian troops were brutal
but effective and the resistance in Manchuria was overcome. Aigun was
captured July 30, Harbin on August 3, and on August 4, Newchwang was
seized. 1 *5
Russia occupied the territory as if it were conquered territory.
"Our army," says Witte, "behaved in Manchuria as in a conquered coun-
16
try, thus preparing the ground for a catastrophe." The aggressive
leaders hoisted the Russian flag at Newchwang and on August 14, General
Groderkoff wrote to the Minister of War that it was fifty years pre-
vious that Nevelskoy haa raised the Russian flag at the mouth of the
Amur River and had succeeded in taking the left bank of the Amur and
now the right bank was taken and the Amur River hau become an Internal
17
waterway.
18
Alexander Ular in an article on, "Russia, Manchuria, and Mon-
golia," claims there never were any Boxers in Manchuria but that the
riots were caused by robbers of Chinese origin who had been instigated
by Russian agents to cross the Amur and to attack the Russian peasants.
Russia did not destroy these Hunhuse robbers but simply drove them
15. Asakawa, p. 142
16. Witte, p. 110
17. Asakawa, p. 145
18. Contemporary Review, v. 84. Aug. 1903, p. 189
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back to the borders of the Mongolian desert. They reserved them for
future occasions when they would be needed for occasional raids to prove
that Russian evacuation of Manchuria was impossible if peace was to be
secured.
Although Russia gave assurance that foreign and Chinese rights
and privileges would not be interfered with, on October 4, the Russian
customs flag was substituted over the customhouse for the Russian naval
flag. The major part of Manchuria was under the military power of
Russia and this act meant the expansion of their economic control. To
defend herself, Russia said her policy was one of friendly assistance
in suppressing the insurrection and restoring order. This situation
was embarrassing to the international relations of Russia. Witte
had always advocated the policy of peaceful penetration and he was
now being opposed by Minister of War, Kuropatkin and Commander-in-Chief
of naval and land forces in the Penninsula, Admiral Alexeiev. They
favored complete control of the territory they hau brought under
Russian military authority. Their problem was, how could the Empire
convert the prize from a temporary conquest into a permanent possession.
19
This attitude caused Count Witte to make the statement, "Count Lams-
ciorff and myself are more afraid of Kuropatkin than of the Chinese."
Again posing as a friend of China, Russia aimed to secure recog-
nition of her power in Manchuria from the Chinese Empire, by leading in
the withdrawal of the diplomatic legations and troops from Peking to
19. Witte, p. 114
J-
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Tientsin. She also favored referring the amount of indemnity to the
Hague Tribunal. Russia desired strongly to be China's best friend, for
if China became helpless, the Russian position would, be weak, but by
20
aiding China, she woulo. strengthen her ov/n position. Therefore on
August 28, Russia sent a circular note to the Powers, saying she had no
designs on Chinese territory but had occupied Newchwang to repel the
rebels and, that with the other Powers they hau aimed to protect the
legations ana to help the Chinese government to overcome her troubles.
Russia promised to withdraw forces from Manchuria when order wa? re-
stored if Powers presented no obstacle. The note also stated that as
long as the Chinese government hau left Peking, the purpose of the troops
there had been accomplished and so the Russian government was directing
the withdrawal of her Legation and the troops from Peking.
The Russian Legation left Peking September 29. Krance, Russia's
ally, finally followed her example. Hovever, as the legations of no
21
other country left, the Russian Legation returned on October 21.
The Powers wondered -vhat was behind the Russian intention of with-
drawal. They felt there was some agreement between Russia and Li Hung-
chang. Russia had assured the world that her occupation was temporary,
but hau given no sign of withurawing her troops. During 1900 Russia had
pushed her railway construction, her military and naval preparations,
both in the leased territory and in all of the Russian far eastern
20. Weigh, p. 100
21. H.B. Morse, "International Relations of the Chinese Empire," v.3 p
p. 306
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provinces. This made the ambitious nature of Russia's aims clearly
evident. She continued military operations and had a large police
force in Chinese Eastern Railway Zone. She was carrying on a vigorous
program of aggressive expansion and was bringing all Manchuria under
Russian control. Kuropatkin had said, when Witte told him that the
Boxer insurrection was partly the result of the seizure of Port Arthur,
"On my part, I am very glad. This will give us an excuse for seizing
22
Manchuria."
To retard the aggression of Russia, England and Germany signed
an agreement on October 16, 1900. In this agreement the Open Door
Policy was restated. The two powers declared they would not "make
use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial
advantages in Chinese dominions and will direct their policy toward
maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese
23
Empire." The agreement also stated that if any other power tried
to gain territorial advantages they would consult together to protect
their interests.
Russia meanwhile continued to occupy territory around Tientsin
where her troops outnumbered those of any other nation. Russia issued
a note on November 6 stating that she had established herself there
"by act of war and right of conquest." The land she declared to
be under her control only and although the Powers objected, Russia
22. Witte, p. 107
23. G.N. Steiger, "China and the Occident," p. 488
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retained it as a concession.
It was becoming more and more evident that Russia was not going
to withdraw troops but was putting strong pressure on China to obtain
further rights in the Eastern Provinces, However, by this time, the
interest of the Powers in China was so great that no power could absorb
a rich section of Chinese territory without a protest from those in-
terested in the integrity of China and the Open Door Policy. Great
Britain, United States and Japan doubted the value of Russia's assurance
as to evacuation ana to the rights of subjects of other countries.
On November 11, 1900, a Rus so -Chinese agreement was signed at Port
Arthur. Russia made China promise, that if any lines were Isiilt under
foreign auspices in northerly or northeasterly direction from Peking,
Russia's assistance would be first asked for. China was to offer no
resistance to building of a railway from Harbin to Port Arthur. China
was to furnish supplies to Russian guards, to disband troops and
surrender all munitions. The forts in South Manchuria, not occupied
24
by Russia, were to be uismantled.
In December, 1901 the American government was informed of a new agree-
ment that was to be signed by China which would increase Russia's mili-
tary control and decrease China's control in Manchuria. The agreement
provided that troops of other nations should not be allowed to protect
railways and no more railway construction was to be allowed in Manchuria
24. Morse, v. 3, p. 344
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except with consent of Russia. Although Count Lamsdorff denied
that this agreement existed, reports persisted and they excited sus-
picion among the Powers. China, who had been at first impressed favor-
ably with the evacuation agreement of Russia, now became suspicious and
fearful. The Powers. also warned China of danger. China, therefore,
refused to sanction the agreement of 1901 and Count Lamsdorff was obliged
to declare that no intention existed to depart from the assurance to
restore Manchuria to China, as soon as a central government was es-
tablished at Peking strong enough to guarantee Russia against dis-
turbances.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
By the beginning of 1902 the Powers were thoroughly aroused by the
26
fact that the Russian military forces held the whole of Manchuria.
Great Britain, from both principle and interest, had been advocating a
policy of the open door ii China which was being undermined by Russian
aggression and Japan looked with apprehension upon Russian expansion
in Manchuria.
Great Britain was especially fearful of Russian expansion toward
India and of the danger the Russian power was creating for her commercial
interests in China. Therefore, feeling that these interests would be
safer if an alliance was formed with a strong power of the Far East,
she took the initiative in suggesting an alliance with Japan. This
alliance, she hoped, might help to maintain the integrity of
25. W.W.Willoughby
,
"Foreign Rights and Interests in China, " p. 159
26. Morse, v. 3, p. 417
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China. Suggestions were made by Great Britain to Japan in April 1901
27
and later in July of the same year.
However, for Japan the Manchurian question was even more serious.
Japan bad maae attempts since 1696 to come to some definite terms with
Russia for she was fearful of Bussi an aggression penetrating down into
Korea and menacing her Interests there. If Russia gained political con-
trol of Manchuria, the independence of Korea and the safety of Japan
would be threatened and a closed door in Manchuria would ruin the econ-
omic activity of Japan. Japan also felt that only a strong alliance
could curb this growing danger and prevent the complete control of Man-
churia by Russia.
The two countries, therefore, who were anxious to keep peace and
maintain the status quo in the Par East were drawn together due to their
common danger and they formed an agreement which was signed on January
30, 1902. It was called the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
This political combination was a danger to Russian Interests. It
26
was a ste^ which Russia should have used all her power to prevent. If
she hau teen willing to come to some agreement with Japan after 1696,
she might have prevented this Alliance or Russia mi ght have faced the
Alliance, if she could have defended her position in Manchuria with all
the forces of the State or had been willing to give up her aggressive
29policy in Korea but these things she could not or would not do. The
27. Asakawa, p. 200
28. Rosen, p. 189
29. Ibid, p. 190
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failure of Russia to coins to some agreement with Japan and her short-
sighted policy of not living up to her promises of withdrawal from
30
Manchuria had fatal consequences and caused the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
of 1902.
The agreement was for a term of five years and both parties recog-
nized the independence of China and Korea and the special interests of
both Japan and Great Britain in those areas. Article I provided that
either power might take any measures necessary to protect their in-
terests in China anu Korea. Article II salu that if, in taking such
action, either power was attacked, the other contracting party would re-
main neutral and try to prevent other powers from joining against its
ally. However, H if any other power should Join in hostilities against
that ally, the other power will come to its assistance, and will conduct
31
tne war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."
This treaty was distinctly a defensive treaty for it baa no
aggressive tendencies. Lord Lansuowne considered the agreement a
measure of precaution and hoped it would help to keep peace or at least
32
to restrict the area of trouble if peace was not possible.
Russia read between the lines and realized that it was aimed at her
but outwardly she took the agreement calmly. In answer to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance she drew up the Russo-?rench agreement and on March
30. See p. 46 and 57
31. ilorse, v. 3, p. 417
32. Asakawa, p. 2 09
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16, the following statement was issued. Russia and Franoe, "being
obliged to take into consideration the case in which either the aggress-
ive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of disturbances in China,"
"might become a menace to their own interests, the two allied
Governments reserve to themselves the right to consult in that contin-
33
gency as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests."
Besides causing this defensive agreement with France, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance influenced Russia to conclude the Russo-Chinese Convention.
Russo -Chinese Convention, 1902
By thi3 Convention, signed on April 8, 1902, Russia agreed to the
re-establishment of Chinese authority in Manchuria and a-^in agreed to
evacuate Manchuria. This evacuation was to take place in three periods
of six months each. During the first six months the troops were to be
withdrawn from the territory in the southwestern part of the province
of Mukden and west of the Liao River. They were to be withdrawn during
the second six months from the rest of the Province of Mukden and
from the Province of Kirin, and the evacuation of Hei-lung-chiang and
the rest of Manchuria was to be completed during the last six months.
This evacuation was to be completed provided no disturbance arose and
that there was no action by the other powers which might interfere.
China on her part confirmed the obligation to protect the railway
and all persons in its employ and bound herself to secure the safety
of all Russian subjects. Any extension of the South Manchurian rail-
33. MacMurray, p. 325
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way or the building of any branches was to be considered a question of
mutual discussion between Russia and China.
Russia's conduct after the treaty showed how broad her interpret-
ation of it was. The treaty to evacuate Manchuria depended upon no
action of the powers interfering, but almost any attitude of the powers
coula be used as an excuse not to withdraw troops. Evacuation also de-
pended upon no new disturbance arising in the territory. Russia could
easily allow the Hunhuse robbers to raid the territory from the Mon-
golian border ana therefore claim that uisturbances were too frequent
to -warrant the withdrawal of her troops from commercial roads ana rail.
34
roau lines. Article II bound China to secure the safety of all
Russian subjects. This security Russia knev; was practically impossible
as long as the Russian soldiers were in Manchuria and border line raids
continued. Article III said that Russia should be notified of the in-
creases in the number of Chinese troops in Manchuria after the Russian
evacuation. By this means Russia could see to it that no large Chinese
force was being stationed in the country.
Although the treaty was unsatisfactory, Great Britain and Japan
did not protest but waited to see if the evacuation would take place.
By October I, the first stage of evacuation was complete although it
was more of a transfer of troops from settled towns of Manchuria to be-
come police of the railway zone where a police force was still allowed.
Count Witte desired to have the Russian troops evacuate Manchuria
34. See p. 55
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so that Russian influence in the Par East could be secured by peaceful
means but General Bezobrazoff 's influence was strong. He haa been sent
by the Emperor in November 1902 to study the natural resources of
Manchuria and he aavocated a policy of industrial aggression backed by
strong military force.
Before the second period of evacuation took place, Russian policy
cnangea and the withdrawal of the troops began to cease. Yingkow, the
treaty port of Hewchwang was to be evacuated by April 8 f 1903. The
Russian power was strong there, the native customs was in Russia's hands
an<t the foreign customs were requireu to work with RussiaT* author! t ies.
The duties paia by the customs were paid not to the Chinese bank but
to the Russo-Chinese Bank which was controlled by Russia. Yinghow was
not evacuated at the date due and other nations became concerned. Russia
gave reasons such as, the presence of foreign ships of war in port, and
uncompleted arrangements for quarantine regulations, but the real reason
was that Russia, uue to past success in imperialistic ventures, meant
to be master in Manchuria as Japan was in Korea.
There was no sign of more withdrawals and a few days later Russia
presented to China seven articles, the acceptance of which would be
necessary before further evacuation took place.
36
The seven points drawn up by Russia were:
1. No new treaty ports or foreign consuls to
be allowed in Manchuria.
35. Steiger, p. 510 ana Morse, v. 3, p. 419
36. Morse, v. 3, p. 421
<
- 66 -
2. No foreigners except Bus si a to be
employed in public service in
North China.
3. The statutes of administration of
Mongolia was not to be changed.
4. Receipts of the Newchwang customs
were to be continued to be deposited
in 3us so -Chinese Bank.
5. The sanitary commission at Newchwang
was to be nominated by Russians.
6. Russia to retain control of Port
Arthur-Yinghow-Mukden telegraph
line.
7. No territory in Manchuria to be
alienatea to any power.
United States, Great Britain and Japan all protested and
warned China against signing. Both Russia and China at first denied
that the agreement existed but later China presented the demands. Count
Lamsuorff still denied that the aemanus haa been maue. He g ve the
United States assurance that Russia would faithfully adhere to its
pledges in Manchuria to respect the rights of other powers. He claimed
that delay of evacuation was cue to the natural necessity of obtaining
assurances from China that she was fulfilling her part of the agreement.
At this time both United States anu Japan were asking for the
opening of more ports in Manchuria and for the privilege of stationing
consuls there. It was in connection with this request that Count
Cassini, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, made statements in
Washington intimating that some negotiations were going on between
Russia and China. It was the day after Count Lamsdorff haa deried the
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the existence of an agreement that Count Cassini said,
of the opening of new treaty ports in 2flan-
churia it is impossible for me to speak
at present, but it is the earnest convic-
tion of those best acquainted with the
state of affairs there, that such a move
will not be to the best interest of the
territory. Were the question solely a
commercial one, it would be different.
But open a treaty port in Manchuria, and
close upon the heels of commerce will
follow political complications of all
kinds, which will increase the threats
to peace.
China was ready to open the ports to United States but said that
difficulties presented by the Russian occupation of Manchuria prevented.
Finally, Secretary Hay succeeded in getting China to sign a treaty to
be effective six months after the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia.
The treaty with United States was signed on October 8, 1903. This
oomnercial agreement provided for the opening of two more Manchurian
towns, Antung and Mukden. It provided for international residence
ana traae in the treaty ports but the rules to govern the trade and
residence of foreigners was to be settled between the two countries.
38
The American-Chinese treaty was the second big blow to Russia.
She opposed the treaty and although she hau started her evacuation of
Manchuria she now reoocupied Mukden. It was very evident that Russia
intended to control Manchuria anc aimed to close the door of Manchuria
to all other nations.
37. Asakawa, p. 250 and '7eigh, p. 110
38. Pasvolsky, p. 33 (The first set-back to Russian policy
was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance)
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Ru 380-Japanese War
The Bass i an failure to live up to her promise of evacuation and
her demand, that China close Manchuria to economic enterprise of all
nations except Russia, led to a serious contest between Japan and
Russia. Count Witte in his Memoirs states, "Our agreement with Japan,
dated April 13, 1898, sanctioned the dominating position of that country
in Korea. If we had faithfully adhered to the spirit of this agreement
there is no doubt but that more or less permanent peaceful relations
would have been established between Japan and Russia." "We
would have quietly kept the Kwantung Penninsula while Japan would have
39
completely dominated Korea."
Russian official opinion at this time was divided between the war
party ana the peace party. The peace party, led by Count Lamsdorff and
Count Witte, held to the latter* s policy of peaceful economic penetra-
tion. It favored an agreement with Japan, as the leaders realized the
dangers that would be involved in a war with Russia, ana they used their
influence in every way possible to get Russia to come to some agreement
over Korea ana Manchuria.
The war party, led by General Kuropatkin,was a keen rival of the
peace party. This party was determined to carry out an aggressive
policy and to continue to construct railways in Manchuria. The war
party was gaining great influence with the Czar who in July, 1903, com-
39. Witte, p. 106
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bined the territories of Amur and Kwantung into a viceroyalty. lie
appointed Admiral Alexelev, who was governor of the Kwantung province,
as viceroy of this territory. Admiral Alexeiev advocated a strong
aggressive policy and was made responsible only to the Czar. He had
command of the naval forces and the troops in the country and had charge
of diplomatic relations of these regions with neighboring territories.
The war party won out in control over the Czar. Count T7itte was dis-
missed from the Ministry of Finance and affairs in the East were placed
under the control of Admiral Alexeiev ana Bezobrazoff
.
Japan realized the danger this meant to her interests in Korea and
Baron Komura sent a telegram to the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg
giving him the viewpoint of the home government and asked the minister
to negotiate with Count Lamsdorff on the Korean question. Japan greatly
desired a lasting peace in the Par East and wanted to eliminate the
irritating circumstances so that the natural resources of the East could
be developed. She appealed to Russia ana requested that she uphold the
Open Door Policy and the territorial integrity of China. This opened
the way for a peaceful agreement.
Russia postponed and evaued all negotiations. All answers that
she sent were very unsatisfactory ana implied that the Manchurian
question was a problem between Russia and China and should be settled
between them and not by any intervention of a third party.
Meanwhile Russian troops were still coming into the district bor-
40. H. Parlet t, "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Manchuria,"
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daring on the Yalu River. The Russians had in 1896 signed an agreement
with the King of Korea. This haa given Russia a lease of over 200
acres. A Russian company had been granted judiciary rights over resi-
dents within this leased area. Extensive work had been carried on by
Russia in the Turaen valley. They haa built up a harbor town, Yongampo,
41
built railroads and forts, and had forced Koreans into unpaid service.
In April 1903 the Russians informed the Korean government that they
would continue operations in the Yalu River valley. This meant they
would expand over a large part of Korea. Korea asked for Russian evacu-
ation but Russia dia not leave, in fact, more Russian troops were moving
down into Manchuria*
The independence of Korea had been recognized as a result of the
Sino-Japanese War ana Japanese interests haa been recognized by England
in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Now Russian encroachments were threat-
ening the existence of these rights in Korea for Russia was even making
attempts to control the taxation ana customs of Korea.
The evacuation of Manchuria was also being delayed by Russia and
42
in September 1903 she made new demands on China. She asked that
(1) China should not cede any ports in Uanchuria to any power but Russia;
(2) Russia should be allowed to construct wharves on the Sungari River
and alloTOd to connect them by telegraph lines; (3) Russia be given
the right to station troops to protect the lines and ships; (4) No
41. Asakawa, p. 319
42. Ibid, p. 316
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greater duties be Imposed on goods brought into Manchuria by rail than
those on goods by river or road; (5) After withdrawal of Russian
troops, the branches of Russo-Chinese Bank be protected by Chinese
troops at the cost of the Bank.
The Powers again urged anu warned China not to accept anu China
finally refused all the demands. United States and Great Britain were
especially interested as this was the time that they were trying to
43
get China to open up more ports.
The fall of Witte and the creation of the new Viceroyalty in the
Amur and the Kwantung provinces, meant the triumph of an aggressive
policy in the Par East and changed the Japanese policy of watchful re-
serve. The activities on the part of Russia as well as the failure to
evacuate Manchuria raised grave doubts in the minds of the Japanese as
to the limits of Russian ambitions. Japan therefore tried again to
get Russia to come to some agreement. She uemanued the complete evacu.
ation of Manchuria and the recognition of Japan's position in Korea.
Russia would not accept this and so later Japan proposed that a line
be drawn across northern Korea that would divide the spheres of in-
fluence of Japan and Russia, the territory north of the line to be in
Russian sphere anu south, to be in Japanese sphere. Russian diplomacy
of delay was again used anu Japan, becoming tired of Russian tactics,
finally broke off diplomatic relations on February 6, 1904.
44
L. T. Lawton feels that Japan was justifiea in preparations for
43. See p. 67
44. L.T. Lawton, "The Empires of the East," v. 1, p. 227
-"T
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war due to Russian expansion, because of the following reasons: (1)
Russia had prevented Japan from holding Port Arthur; (2) between
1895-1905 the Siberian railway was extended to the Manchurian border;
(3) the Chinese Eastern railway had been built across Manchuria in
which Bussian towns hau risen and Russian emigrants had settled; (4)
the mineral resources and commercial advantages in one of the richest
territories of China had been absorbed by Russia; (5) Vladivostok
and Port Arthur hau been converted into fortresses; (6) Russian war-
ships were making an imposing fleet in the Pacific and Russian success
in Korea would mean the extension of Russian influence within a few
miles of Japan*
Although Russia claimed her rights anu concessions haa been
legally granted by China, she had actually gained these during periods
of weakness in China and had paid bribes in many cases for the con-
cessions received. Russia hau plenty of natural resources in Siberia
to develop but her big obstacle had been the lack of an ice-free port
ana she hau felt that the taking of Port Arthur was essential to her
progress in the East. How that aggressive policy brought about a most
disastrous war for Russia in the East.
The treaty of Portsmouth, signed September 5, 1905, was a big blow
to Russian expansion in the East. By this treaty Russia transferred
to Japan, with the consent of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Dalny,
the adjacent territory and v;aters, ana all rights, privileges and con-
cessions connectea with the lease. Russia also transferred to Japan
all public works and properties in the leaseu territory. The southern
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part of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur and
45
all its branches were ceded to Japan*
Japan ana Russia mutually agreed to evacuate Manchuria with the
exception of the Liaotung Penninsula ana restore the administration to
China. Russia recognized Japanese political, military, and economic
interests in Korea anu agreed not to interfere with any measures Japan
might take in that territory. Both countries agreed not to obstruct
any measures taken by China to develop coaxnerce or industry in Manchuria,
and neither country was to exploit their railways in Manchuria for any-
thing except commercial and industrial purposes.
On December 22, 1905 the Chinese government consented to all trans-
fers and assignments that hau. been made by Russia to Japan. Russia
now retained only the Chinese Eastern Railway as a joint commercial
enterprise with China and the northern section of the branch that ex-
tended south from Harbin. They controlled as far south as Changchun.
The total mileage of railway left under Russian control was about
46
1080 miles.
Russia hau been diligently and consistently extending her borders
and hau been most inaustrious in building the Empire, but in 1905 she
was unprepared for war. She lacked military skill, supplies were in-
sufficient and too far away. Harbin was a center of gaiety and
dissipation. The army officers in Manchuria had been living a life of
luxury and indulgence, the authorities were lax in tneir discipline,
45. V.H.Yakhontoff , "Russia and the Soviet Union," p. 372
46. Willoughby, p. 426
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and a large per cent of the men in the army had not had long connection
47
with the army. The army was lacking in strong, energetic soldiers.
Although this war proved the value of the Trans-Siberian railway,
it also proved that it was impossible to depend on a single line rai lway
for transportation of troops anu for the maintenance of an army so far
away from the base of supplies. If the railway had been double-tracked,
Japan might have met with severe defeat.
However, the war of 1904-1905 enued Russian intense and thoughtless
imperialism in the Par East ana put an effective check on Russian ad-
vance in Manchuria. "With the fall of Port Arthur and l?ukden, she had
48
reached the crossing of the most perilous ways in her whole history."
After the war, Russia dia not give up her policy of penetration in
the Par East. She haa (hiring a period of 200 years penetrated Asia and
created an empire, that stretched from Russia in Europe to the Pacific,
and she still hau faith in her Par Eastern aims. After the defeat,
Russia started to re-study her position in the East and to conduct sur-
veys in the province of Amur and the Baikalia region in order to continue
the Russian policy by means of the building of the Amur railway.
Obstacles to Russia were hinurances, but they did not mean defeat;
they delayed but dia not stop the completion of the policy. Lawton
49
sa.ys, "While she has experienced severe reverses from time to time.
47. Lawton, p. 276
48. B.Burleigh, "The Empire of the East," p. 438
49. Lawton, p. 431
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never has she been thrown back on her original position. Even her de-
feats have ended in gain and. after each of these, she has waited her
opportunity and prepared her way for yet another step forward. Her
advance is slow, bat it is sure as fate."

V. HJSSIAN POLICY OF CONCILIATION AND DEFENSE, 1905-1917
The Amur Railway
After the Russo-Japanese War tne Russian policy, "underwent a
change from an offensive and aggressive policy to a conciliatory and
defensive procedure." Russia made the Chinese Eastern Railway the
first line of defense, the Amur River the second, and the Amur Railway
the third. fc Vladivostok was developed into a fortress and a naval
station and plans were made to double-track: the Trans-Siberian Rail-
way.
The loss of the railway outlet at Port Arthur made Russia feel
the need of an all Russian line to Vladivostok. On April 14, 1908
the Amur Railway bill passed the Duma. The bill provided for 1300
miles of railway across unexplored, marshy territory of extreme tem-
peratures. The route had been partly planned before 1896 but then
the shorter route across Manchuria hau been obtained. This Amur rail-
way would link up with the Ussuri railway at Kharborovsk and would
complete the all-Russian railway from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok.
Russia felt that the building of this line was necessary for two
reasons; (1) because of the limitations that hau been imposed by the
Portsmouth Treaty, which allowed the llanchurian railways to be used
only for commercial and industrial purposes; and (2) because of the
1. M.J.Bau, "Foreign Relations of China," p. 103
2. Ibid, p. 105
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option that China had to parchase the Chinese Eastern Railway at the
end of thirty-six years. If Russia was to have an Empire it must
protect and secure all its territory and without this railway the Mar-
itime Province might be isolated and Eastern Siberia left undefended.
The Ussuri railway would not be of any strategical value without some
connecting link under Russian control* The reporter of the Committee
of National Defense said in an address to the Duma, "We came to the
unanimous decision that this line must be built without delay and that
we must complete it by or in 1912. We must also lay down the second
track within the same time."
Russia realized that after the Russo-Japanese War the political
situation in the East hau changed and that the Maritime Province was of
more strategic value and importance since the loss of the Kwantung
Penninsula. Vladivostok was now Russia's only outlet that provided
any chance for commercial possibilities ana the Ussuri district was
recognized as a very fertile territory and it contained mineral re-
sources as well as navigable waterways.
The railway was of an aggressive nature, for it provided a way to
concentrate large armies in the East and might arouse suspicions in
neighboring countries, yet, "It is," says Lawton, "a broaa and accepted
principle of modern statecraft that no civilized and progressive country
should leave undeveloped ana out of reach a vast expanse of its
4territories."
3. L.J. Lawton, "The Empires of the Far East," v.l, p. 439
4. Ibid, p. 444
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Convention of 1907 Between Japan and Bussia
Japan haa now become the dominating factor In Manchuria. Bussia,
to defend her Interests there, adopted a policy of conciliation with
her recent rival. luring the years following the Russo-Japanese War,
Japan and Russia made several treaties which changed Japan's enemy into
a valuable partner.
IXiring June and July 1907, Japan and Russia drew up conventions over
the railway situation in Manchuria. The provisions of these conven-
tions aimed to provide a mutual agreement of the two governments for
the cooperation of the South Mane hurl anRailway Company and the Chinese
Eastern Railway Company. Agreements were maae concerning junctions,
the transfer of goods, time schedules for connections, passenger and
freight charges and general management of the railways.
The two countries also drew up a political convention which was
signed July 30, 1907. They said in the treaty that this was to "con-
solidate the relations of peace ana good neighborhood which have been
happily re-established between Japan and Russia," and they wished,
,1 to remove for the future every cause of misunderstanding in the re-
5latlons of the two Empires."
In Article I each country agreed to respect the territory and the
rights that each hau received through treaties with China. The Open
Boor Policy was upheld in Article II.
5. Manchuria, "Treaties and Agreements," p. 117
6. Ibid, p. 117

Article II. The two High Contracting
Parties recognize the independence and the
territorial integrity of the Empire of China
and the principle of equal opportunity in
whatever concerns the commerce and industry
of all nations in that Empire, and undertake
to sustain and defend the maintenance of the
status quo ana respect for tnis principle by
all the pacific means within their reach.
A secret agreement was made at the same time in order to avoid
all causes of friction and misunderstanding in connection with questions
relating to Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea. Japan's interests in Korea
were recognized by Russia in this agreement and Japan recognized Russian
interests in Outer Mongolia. Both countries were to refrain from inter-
fering with the other in its developments in their respective spheres,
in Manchuria they took the eastward course of the Konni River as a
dividing line for their interests. Japan agreed not to seek railway
or telegraph concessions north of the line, and Russia woula refrain
7
from any concessions south of the line.
Treaties Over Political Rights in the Railway Zone
In May, 1907 a convention was drawn up between China and Russia
that reaffirmed the Russian rights very strongly. The Powers objected,
for they claimed that the Chinese Eastern Railway was becoming more than
a commercial enterprise. It was too much of a government agency having
political jurisdiction. Russia also was having a dispute with China
over the interpretation of the 1696 agreement for the construction and
working of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Russia attempted to exercise
7. Morse and MacKair, "Far Eastern International Relations," p. 520
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exclusive jurisdiction over both the Chinese and the foreigners at
a
Harbin ana at other settlements in the railway zone. Russia claimed
she had political control over every one living in the area, because
of the clause of the agreement of 1696 which gave her "absolute and
exclusive right of auminis trat ion of its lands." China refused to
recognize this interpretation, ana the United States claimed the terms
of the contract applied only to business aaministrat ion and railway
development, but that the political administration still remained in
the hands of China.
The matter was finally settled by an agreement signed by Russia
and China on May 10, 1909. In this agreement Russia acknowledged
China's sovereignty in the railway area ana China agreed to the es-
tablishment of municipal councils in the zone. The inhabitants of the
municipalities might elect delegates who should choose an Executive
Committee to carry out all resolutions decideu upon at the meetings
of all the residents. The right to vote was to be based on ownership
of real estate or the payment of fixed annual rental. The Assembly
of delegates would have the authority to deal with all local matters
of public concern. They would also have the power to determine the
regulations in regard to police and the amount of taxes to be
9
assessed.
The Powers refused to approve of this agreement for they felt it
8. LI.T.Z. Tyau, "Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations
between China ana Other States," p. 17
9. W.W.V/illoughby,"Foreign Rights and Interests in China, "pp. 164, 165
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gave the mixed municipalities too much power over the subjects of
the foreign governments. The question was not finally settled with the
Powers until 1914. At that time Great Britain came to an agreement with
Russia. She agreed that the taxes for municipal ana public purposes for
the common good might be collected from the British subjects living in
the railway zone. The British subjects were to be able to enjoy the
same privileges as the Russian subjects and would be entitled to benefit
10
from any more favored treatment given to subjects of other Powers.
Russia asked the French government to recognize the obligation on the
part of its subjects, in the railway zone, to observe the municipal reg-
ulations and to pay the taxes levied. Prance consented as did all the
other Powers during 1914, except the United States, who refused to
accept the arrangement. United States insisted that the payment of
taxes of the American citizens was to be voluntary and was to be made
through the American Consul.
Russo-Japanese Convention of 1910
In 1909 Americans who hau been watching the struggle over con-
cessions ana spheres of influence in China becane concerned over
affairs in Manchuria. On November 6, 1909 a plan was sent to the
British Foreign Office outlining a scheme for neutralizing the railways
of Manchuria. Mr. Philanaer C. Knox, the secretary of state, had
suggested this plan, which was to enable China to purchase the Russian
ana Japanese railways in Manchuria with a loan made to her for that
10. Manchurian Treaties, pp. 155 and 154
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purpose by the Powers. Aftei the purchase the roaas were to be super-
vised by those countries. This, he felt, would bring about a coopera-
tive feeling which would be substituted for the feeling of rivalry and
suspicion. England was in sympathy with the plan but felt that she could
do nothing because of her agreement with Russia in 1899. 11 When the
plan was presented to the other Powers, China and Germany favored the
plan but Russia, Japan and France refused flatly to have anything to do
with the scheme. Russia answered, "as nothing threatens either the
sovereignty or the open-door policy in Manchuria," "it must de-
clare with absolute frankness that the establishment of an international
administration and control of the Manchurian railways would seriously
injure the Russian interests, both public and private, to which the Im-
12
perial Government attaches capital Importance."
Instead of helping the situation in Manchuria and furthering the
policy of integrity of China, the Knox neutralization scheme brought
Russia and Japan closer together and resulted in a new understanding,
which gave joint action for the protection of their common interests.
Russia ano Japan brought pressure upon China. On February 2, 1910, a
note was sent to China warning her not to discuss projects of this type
without first consulting them and on February 8, 1910, Russia sent a note
saying, "In regard to all future railways in Manchuria which China may
propose to build with borrowed capital, the Russian government must be
11. See p. 50
12. V.H.Yakhontoff , "Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East,"
p. 105
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first consulted."
On July 4, 1910 Russia and Japan drew up the second agreement which
still further strengthened their friendship. This convention made the
two countries allies for maintaining the status quo in Manchuria and
tneir special interests became really spheres of political activity.
14
Articles II and III show how strong this alliance was becoming.
Article II. Each of the High Contracting
Parties engages to maintain and to respect
the status quo in Manchuria as it results
from all the treaties, conventions or other
arrangements hitherto concluded, either be-
tween Russia and Japan or between these two
Powers and China. Copies of the aforesaid
arrangements have been exchanged between
Russia ana Japan.
Article III. In case any event of such
a nature as to menace the above mentioned
status quo should be brought about, the two
High Contracting Parties will in each in-
stance enter into communication with each
other, for the purpose of agreeing upon
the measures that they may Judge it necess-
ary to take for the maintenance of the said
status quo .
A secret agreement was also drawn up in 1910 in which both parties
agreed; (1) to refrain from all political activities in the sphere of
the other party; (2) not to see : any privilege or concession in the
other parties sphere which would harm their special Interests; and (3)
to respect all rights that each party had received in the sphere by
treaty or by convention.
13. Willoughby, p. 185
14. Manchurian Treaties, p. 141
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Russo-Japanese Alliance, 1916
During the Y/orld War, Japan presented in 1915 the Twenty-one
Demands to China. This created strong opposition among the powers but
at that time, they were unable to make any objections for they were
powerless to enforce them, due to the serious activities in Europe,
Japan and Russia took the opportunity to still further strengthen their
position in Manchuria and Mongolia by signing a new agreement on July
3, 1916. In order to prevent any future possibility of dispute from
Germany, United States, Great Britain, or any other power, they Issued
this warning which was practically a military alliance between Russia
and Japan for the preservation of peace in the Far East. This conven-
tion announced that the two countries, in order to keep peace in the
East agreed not to enter combinations that were hostile or that they
would not oppose each other in any political combination and it pledged
each other support and cooperation in case the interests of either party
were threatened.
15
The following two Articles of the secret treaty of 1916 bound
the two parties still more closely by the agreement to oppose any third
party that should try to dominate China. This treaty applied not only
to Manchuria, but to all China.
Article I. Both the High Contracting
Parties recognize that the vital Interests
of one and the other of them require the
safeguarding of China from the political
dominion of any third Power whatsoever,
15. Wllloughby, p. 211
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having hostile designs against Russia
or Japan; and therefore mutually obli-
gate themselves in the future at all
times when circumstances demand, to
enter upon open-hearted dealings, based
on complete trust, in order to take
necessary measures with the object of
preventing the possibility of occurrence
of said state of affairs.
Article II. In the event, in conse-
quence of measures taken by mutual consent
of Russia and Japan, on the basis of the
preceding article, a declaration of war
is made by any third Power contemplated
by Article II of this agreement, against
one of the Contracting Powers, the other
Party, at the first demand of its ally,
must come to its aid. Each of the High
Contracting Parties herewith covenants,
in the event such a condition arises,
not to conclude peace with the common
enemy, without preliminary consent there-
for from its ally.
Neither party, however, was bound to aid the other "unless it be
given guarantees by its allies that the latter will give it assistance
corresponding in character to the importance of the approaching con-
16
flict." This agreement was to last for a period of five years but
would continue unless it was denounced by one of the two parties.
The treaty of 1907, bound the parties to respect the independence
and territorial integrity of China, the treaty of 1910 established
16. Morse and MacNair, p. 588
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cooperation and the determination to defend the status quo in Manchuria
and the agreement of 1916 added Mongolia to the spheres and opposed any
attempt of a third party to extend political domination over China.
Russo-Japanese relations had in the early part of the century been
dominated by feelings of suspicion, and intrigue which led to war, but
between 1905 and 1916 the relations had reached a stage of mutual under-
standing and growing confidence for future friendship.
Russia in Mongolia
Before the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was interested in Mongolia
only for commercial and economic reasons, but after the war was over
she became interested for political reasons. Russia had tried to main-
tain buffer states between herself anu China. She haa recently lost
most of her power in Manchuria anu now she made a special effort to de-
fend her interests in Mongolia. Her policy was mainly aggressive but
it was for a defensive purpose, for Chinese colonization in Mongolia
haa been increasing greatly since 1909. Russia had always been fear-
ful of Siberia being overrun with Chinese emigrants. The Russian peasant
hau no chance of competing with the low standard of the Chinese laborer.
Outer Mongolia had many well-watered valleys, dense forests and a great
deal of mineral wealth. If the Chinese once established themselves in
the fertile valleys, Russia was afraid that the political frontier would
be swept asiue and her interests in Mongolia seriously threatened.
Russian relations with Mongolia were closer than those between
Mongolia and China. In 1881 Russia had obtained the treaty of St.
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Petersburg with China which had given her privileges of great value
in Mongolia. The privileges of being able to have consuls in Mongolia
and Turkestan, and having their merchants carry on frontier trade free
from duty within a thirty-three mile limit, had stimulated Russian pene-
tration in Mongolia* As their Interest increased they pictured an in-
dependent Mongolian state under Russian influence. This would be a
valuable asset in the future for Russia's imperialistic designs for
18
economic control of China. Some of the Mongols had become Russian
subjects although they kept their own language ana customs. The treaty
of 1881 hau been renewed in 1891 and again in 1901. It was due to be
renewed in 1911. It was over this renewal that Russia and China dis-
agreed anu trouble started in which Russia was glad to uphold ilongolian
interests.
China, between 1881 and 1909, haa maue very little attempt to
colonize Mongolian territory, especially Outer Mongolia which is nearest
to Russia. It was wild territory and was separateu from Inner Mongolia
by the Gobi Desert. By 1909, however, many Chinese were going into
Outer Mongolia as a result of a colonization scheme to buildup trade
19
ana railway construction. China had allowed Mongolia to have auto-
nomous local governments but maintained a resident and a military
governor at Drga. Outer Mongolia had a population of 500,000 Mon-
17. See p. 22
18. L.Pasvolsky, "Russia in the Far East," p. 53
19 - Yakhontoff
, p. 75
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gollans, 200,000 Chinese and 5,000 Russians. When the Chinese mer-
chants, officials and settlers emigrated into Mongolia between 1909 -
1911, the native princes became alarmed. The Chinese merchants took
advantage of the Mongols and made them loans at high rates of interest
on the security of their lanus. Then, when they were unable to pay,
they seized the territory. In 1910 and 1911 the Chinese government
attempted to interfere with the autonomy of the Mongol chiefs and tried
to introduce reforms. Garrisons v?ere set up and a strict administra-
tive system was introduced. The Mongols were taxed, made to give mili-
tary service and furnish supplies to officials.
The attempt to bring Mongolia under Chinese control came too
late to be accepted by the Mongols. The princes of the country held
a conference and appealed to Russia for aid. Trade between Russia and
Mongolia had built up a strong feeling of interest between the two
peoples. Centers of trade had been built up at Kiakhta on the Russian
side and at Maimachen on the Mongolian side. The Mongol leaders now
asked Russia to assist them in gaining their freedom from China, whom
they felt had begun to impose an oppressive and despotic rule.
Russia had in this appeal another ideal chance to strengthen her
power in Mongolia. China was having trouble with outbreaks at home,
which resulted in the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and could not keep
troops in Mongolia to protect her interests. The Mongols, due to the
weakened condition of China, held a second conference and declared the
20. American Journal of Law, v. 10, 1916
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complete independence of Outer Mongolia. She claimed that the over-
throw of Manchu rulers in China freed them from allegiance to China, as
it had been the Manchus who had conquered Mongolia. Russia gave a
great deal of aid and encouragement to the new government but did not
actually recognize it as she was afraid of alarming the Powers. She
denied having any territorial designs in Mongolia but claimed that her
21desire was to mediate between China and Mongolia. She wanted peace
ana trade. Mongolian trade itself was not so important but the trade
route through Mongolia for the importation of tea to Russia from the
Yang-Tse valley was an important part of Russian trade.
However, in 1912 Russia took definite steps to increase her in-
fluence. On September 6, 1912, Russia announced that China had failed
to give notice for the termination of the treaty of 1881 and therefore
22
she considered it still in force for another ten years but she would
abolish the zone of free traue on the Russian side of the frontier on
23
January 1, 1913. Russia also, in November, 1912, entered into an
agreement with Mongolia as an Independent country thus recognizing the
autonomy of Mongolia. By this treaty Russia agreed to assist Mongolia
to maintain their autonomy and to break the hold of Peking. She also
agreed to help prohibit the admission of Chinese colonizers and troops.
In return Mongolia gave to the Russians many rights and privileges of
21. Morse and MacNair, p. 565
22. By the treaty of 1881 it might be renewed at ten year intervals
or abrogated by either nation on a six months notice.
23. Manchurian Treaties, p. 115
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traae. These included freedom of travel and navigation, the right to
lease and own property, to engage in fishing, mining and lumbering and
freedom from customs auties. The treaty also confirmed Russian rights
in Mongolia and provided that no rights should be granted to foreign
nationals that were not granted to Russians. In January, 1913, the
sovereigns of Tibet and Mongolia recognized each other as rulers of
independent countries.
The new government in China had refused to recognize the autonomy
of Mongolia and protested against this treaty between Russia and Mon-
golia. Hov/ever, aue to the strong support of Mongolia by Russia, China
was obliged to recognize the autonomy. This was done through a Russo-
Chinese understanding maue November 5, 1913. Representatives of the
governments signed the agreement, by which Russia recognized the
suzerainty of China in Outer Mongolia and China recognized the autonomy
of Outer Mongolia. China was not to intervene in the Internal matters
of commerce and industry and would not maintain civil or military
officials or troops in the country or attempt further colonization.
China also agreed to consult Russia on any political and territorial
problems in Outer Mongolia ana the Mongolian authorities were to take
part in the consultations.
The outbreak of the World War in 1914 gave Russia still another
chance for increased power. On September 30, 1914, Russia signed
another agreement with Mongolia which gave her a concession for the
builaing of a telegraph line and pledged Mongolia to consult Russia
before making any railway concessions. This gave Russia practically

complete control of the railway policy of Outer Mongolia and safe-
guarded her frontier.
The three countries of Russia, China and Outer Mongolia now
planned an agreement which became known as the Tripartite Agreement.
It was signed June 7, 1915 at Kiakhta. In this treaty the countries
24
came to the following agreements:
1. Outer Mongolia recognized Chinese
suzerainty.
2. China hau treaty making power in polit-
ical and territorial questions but Mon-
golia could make commercial and indus-
trial treaties.
3. Russia and China recognized the autonomy
of Outer Mongolia ana promised to abstain
from all internal administration of
Mongolia.
4. There was to be no customs duties on
either Chinese or Russian imports*
5. China was to consult Russia on all polit-
ical questions concerning Outer Mongolia.
6. Chinese residents were to be under
Chinese jurisdiction and Russian resi-
dents under Russian jurisdiction. Mixed
cases were to be tried in mixed courts.
This treaty practically placed Outer Mongolia under the joint
protection of China and Russia and made Outer Mongolia a buffer state
between Russia and China. It remained in force until 1917. After
the Russian Revolution, China took advantage of the Russian collapse
and disregarded the Kiakhta convention and re-established her
24. S.A. Korff, "Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half
Century," pp. 73 and 74
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sovereignty over Mongolia. However, in 1921, the Bolsheviksassi sted
the Mongols, China was driven out again and in 1924 a republican govern-
ment on the Soviet model and under Soviet influence was established
and Mongolia became a semi-independent country nominally federated
with China but influenced, if not actually controlled, by Soviet
Russia.25
25. H. Parlett, "A Brief Diplomatic Account of Events in Manchuria,"
p. 55
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71. SU24IARY
The situation in Siberian Russia in 1917 was the result of many years
of effort on the part of Russian leaders, some of whom had advocated quiet
penetration and friendly alliances, while others had attempted aggressive
steps to gain power and control in both unclaimed lands and also in terri-
tories claimed by other powers*
Early Penetration
IXiring the early period Yermak, and in later years Miraviev, with
Nevelskoy's aid, led a peaceful expansion through unclaimed areas from the
Urals to the Pacific. A partial legalization of the position of Russia
was granted during this period by China to prevent Cossack raids. She did
not dream that the treaties of 1689 and 1727 were the beginnings of a long
history of political and commercial expansion and conquest.
Expansion Through Friendship
Muraviev brought about the final sanctioning of Russian control of
these areas in southern Siberia by the treaties of 1658 and I860. This
sanction was probably received quicker by Muraviev than it would have been
by others because he did not make many efforts to make settlements in terri-
tory where China would feel that the Russians were aggressively encroaching
upon Chinese territory. He was aided, however, by the fact that China had
more vital interests at stake in other parts of her Empire.
The victory of Japan over China opened the eyes of Russia to the dan-
ger of a strong competing power in Manchuria. It led to her successful
attempt to get the cooperation of other European countries in preventing
Japan from getting a stronghold in Manchuria at Port Arthur.
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The next character to dominate Russian policy In the Far East was
Count Witte, who stood strongly for peaceful economic expansion. His in-
fluence brought about the secret treaty of 1896, the establishment of the
Russo-Chinese Bank, ana the Chinese Eastern Railway Company through which
he hoped to have a Russian control over financial enterprises in the Par
East* His insistence on maintaining a peaceful policy led to conflict
with those in Russia who were gaining influence with the Czar and who ad-
vocated a more aggressive policy.
Period of Aggression
The rush for concessions in China in 1898 was start ea by Germany's
receiving the grant of Kiaochow. This was one of the periods when the
policy of Russia was stated to the foreign countries by two different auth-
orities. The Czar agreed to allow Germany to take the territory, but made
no attempt to notify Witte, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, of his
statement. Witte did not know of it until after those who desired to
carry out the aggressive policy and seize Port Arthur, had made plans,
agreed to by the Czar, to take the territory. This was an act absolutely
opposite to all aims and plans of the Russian Foreign Minister and led
eventually to his loss of power.
The foreign policy of the military leaaers, Kuropatkin and Alsxeiev
between 1698 and 1900, included the seizing of Port Arthur and the expan-
sion of military power in Manchuria during the Boxer uprising in spite of
her declaration on the Open Door Policy ana her promises to evacuate Man-
churia. During the Boxer trouble Russia represented herself as an ally
to the Powers and as a friend to China while she was mak'ng herself a
master of Manchuria by increasing her military power. This led to the
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Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Russo-Chinese agreement during the year
1902, but these agreements did not bring about the withdrawal of Russian
aggressive policy. Instead the aggressiveness continued until it brought
on the Russo-Japanese War.
Policy of Conciliation and Defense
Russia, now finding that her aggression was not possible against such
a powerful competitor, changed her tactics and by political conventions
and secret agreements became an ally of Japan in the defense of their
positions in Manchuria. This was easily done for wars between countries
having autocratic governments might better be called wars between the
leaders who formed the policies of the country, therefore a change in the
policy of the leaders changes enemies to friends, all of which is done
without any regard as to the feelings of the people of the countries.
Russian policy in Mongolia was also a defensive policy for she
wanted Mongolia as a buffer state and her fear between 1909 - 1915 was of
the gradual increase of Chinese colonization and power in Mongolia which
would mean too much danger to the Russian boundary. A buffer state can-
not continue to exist when either of the powers become desirous of expand-
ing for that expansion is a challenge to the other power whose interests
are established in the buffer state. The decision of 1915 was an agree-
ment between the two interested states and the Mongols themselves over
the powers that each should have so that Mongolia might exist and peace
be maintained in the territory. By this agreement Russia retained the
greatest control, but whether this state continues indefinitely depends
upon Russia*s method of control and the attitude of Mongolia and China.
i
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Russia, China and Japan would all like to have Manchuria remain as a
buffer state but each one would like the predominant power and economic
control in the territory. Japan, afraid of Russian communistic aggression
since 1917, which, if it led to the control of Manchuria, would endanger
her country as well as her interests in Manchuria and desirous of gaining
control of the economic development of the natural resources there, went
into Manchuria and now the militaristic party has taken control, but is it
to be permanent? China is too weak and unorganized to resist, and Russia
is too concerned over her affairs in European Russia to get into any con-
flict over Manchuria. Will the conditions remain the same in the future?
Aside from the fact that the situation has become one of international im-
portance, all three countries have legal claims in Manchvria and only time
can tell what the future status of the buffer state will be. Will Japan's
power be challenged by a growing Chinese power or by a reawakened intense
interest of Russia in Manchuria; will Japan and Russia, due to a weak
China again adopt a conciliatory policy and control Manchuria on a co-
operative basis; or eventually will Manchuria be recognized under Japanese
influence as Tibet is under British authority anu Mongolia is under
Russian domination?

- 97 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Asakawa, K.
,
Russo-Japanese Conflict, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Co, 1904
Ban, 25. J., Foreign Relations of China.New York, Revel Co. 1922
Beresford, C. W. , The Break-up of China. New York, Harper Bros. 1899
Blakeslee, G.H., The Pacific Area. Boston, World Peace Foundat ion, 1929
Bland, J.O.P., Li Hung-chang. New York, Henry Holt Co., 1917
Burleigh, B., The Empire of the East. Chapman and riall, London, 1905
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Manchuria, Treaties and
Agreements. Pivision of International Law, Pamphlet 44,
Washington, 1921
Clyde, pIh., International Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922.
Columbus, Ohio. Ohio State University Press, 1926
Dillon, E.J., The Eclipse of Russia. New York, Doran Co., 1918
Golder, P.A., Russian Expansion in the Pacific. Cleveland, A.H. Clark
Co., 1914
Gundry, 3.S., China ana her Neighbors. London, Chapman anu Hall, 1893
Hall, J.W. , The Revolt of Asia. New York, G.P.Putna-n's Sons, 1927
Kent, P.H., Railroad Enterprise in China. London, 1907
Kori'f, Baron S.A., Russia's Foreign Relations uuring the Last Half
Century. New York, MacMillan, 1922
Krausse, A.S., Russia in Asia, 1558-1899. New York, Henry Holt Co. ,1699
Lattimore, 0., Manchuria, the Cradle of Conflict. New York, MacMillan
Co., 1932
Lawton, L.J., The Empires of the i'ar East. London, Grant and Richards,
1912
Leroy-Beaulien, P., Awakening of the East. London, 1910
Little, A. J., The Far East. London, Oxford, 1905
MacMurray, J.V.A., editor, Treaties and Agreements with ana Concerning
China, 1894-1911 Vol. 1. Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace, Washington, D. C. 1921
Morse, H. B., International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vols. 2 and
3. London, Longnans, Green & Co., 1910, 1918.
Morse and MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations. Boston, Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 1931.
Norman, H.K. , The Peoples and Politics of the Far East. London, Unwin
Bros., 1895.
Parle tt, Sir Harold, A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria.
London, University Press, 1929.
Pasvolsky, Leo, Russia in the Far East. New York, MacMillan Co., 1922
Rambaud, A., The Expansion of Russia, New York, 1905.
Rockhill, W.W. , Treaties and Conventions with or Concerning China, 1894-
1904, Washington, 1908.
Rosen, R.R., Forty Years of Diplomacy, Vol. 1, Unwin Bros., London, 1922.
Shoemaker, M.M.
,
The Gr^at Siberian Railway , New York , 1903.
Skrine, F.H. , The Expansion of Russia. Cambridge Series, Cambridge
University Press, 1904.
Smith, A.H. , China in Convulsion. New York, 1901.
Sokolsky, G.E. , The Tinder Box of Asia. New York, Doubleday, Doran Co.
1932.
Stanoyevich, M.S., Russian Foreign Policy in the East. San Francisco,
Liberty Co., 1916.
Steiger, G.N. , China and the Occident. New Haven, Yale University Press,
1927.
Tong, H.K. , Facts about the Chinese Eastern Railway. Harbin, 1929.
Treat, P.J., The Far East. London, N.Y.
,
Harper Bros. 1928.
Tyau, M.T.Z., The Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations
between China and other States. Shanghai, Commercial Press,
1917.

- 99 -
Vlaaimir (pseud.), Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway.
London, Sampson Low & Marston Co*, 1699
Weigh, Ken Shen, Russo -Chinese Diplomacy. Shanghai, Commercial Press,
1928.
Williams, S.T., The History of China. New York, Harper Bros., 1928
Willoughby, ',7.7/., Foreign Rights and Interests in China. Vol. 1.
Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1927.
Yakhontoff, V.H., Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East. New
York, Coward-McCann, 1931.
Yarmolinsky, A., editor, Hemoirs of Count Witte. New York, Doubleday,
Page Co., 1921
Young, C. Walter, The International Relations of Manchuria. Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1929

- 100 -
MAGAZINE A3PICLES
Clarence Cary, "The Trans-Siberian Railway and its new terminus in China,"
Forum, vol. 25 Hay - 1898, p. 285
E.J. Dillon, "Russia and Manchuria," Contemporary Review, vol. 83,
June, 1903, p. 684
P. A. Kropotkin, "The Russians in Manchuria," Forum, vol. 31, May 1901,
p. 267.
U.W. Rockhill, "The Questions of Outer Mongolia," Far Eastern Review,
June, 1915.
G. E. Sokolsky, "Struggle for Manchurian Railways," Far Eastern Review,
March, 1915.
A. Ular, "Russia, Manchuria and Mongolia," Contemporary Review, vol.84,
August, 1903, p. 189
E.T. Y/illiams, "The Relations between China, Russia and Mongolia,"
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 1916, p.798

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
1 1719 02553 0116

